



## IRELAND: REGAINING CREDITWORTHINESS

Ireland met all its commitments in 2011, outperforming fiscal targets in particular; Further progress continued in H1 2012

July 2012



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
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# SUMMARY




Ireland expects to achieve fiscal targets for second consecutive year in 2012, while continuing to grow its economy modestly



## Target for 2012 is to build on the recovery

- **Government set to cut deficit to 8.6% of GDP**
  - ▶ Troika (EC/ ECB/ IMF) very pleased with delivery on all Programme benchmarks; significant outperformance versus fiscal target in 2011
- **Second consecutive year of modest GDP growth expected**
  - ▶ Export growth remains resilient so far in 2012, despite euro area difficulties; Ireland's forecast GDP growth near top of euro area league
  - ▶ But domestic demand may continue to decline at a slow pace in 2012
- **Second half of bank deleveraging plan to continue**
  - ▶ More than half completed in 2011 (first year of three 2011-2013)
  - ▶ Government to reform insolvency laws to deal with mortgage arrears
- **National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) to move into phase of adding value to troubled assets**
  - ▶ Ireland's main contingent liability being reduced: on track to repay €7.5bn by 2013 of senior NAMA bonds (has repaid €3.25bn by end-H1 2012).
  - ▶ NAMA to invest €2bn in the Irish economy over next four years





## NTMA plans to continue its phased return to the market in 2012


- **Conducted its first Treasury Bill auction for almost two years in July 2012**
  - ▶ Sold €500m with cover of 2.8 at 1.8%
  - ▶ Around 80% sold to international buyers
- **Two main components of full market re-entry late in 2012 or early 2013**
  - ▶ Launch of longer-term bond issue
  - ▶ Introduction of amortising bonds and inflation-linked bonds: demanded mainly by local pension funds/ life assurance industry
- **But return to more normal funding cycle subject to euro area conditions**
  - ▶ EU summit declaration of 29 June 2012 to break “vicious circle between banks and sovereigns” and to examine Irish situation on basis of similar cases being treated equally
  - ▶ many questions about euro area crisis resolution remain unanswered, despite some progress towards banking union in June
  - ▶ ongoing market turbulence is unhelpful






# Ireland has passed the turning point of its crisis

## General Govt. deficit (% of GDP)




Source: Department of Finance; CSO

## GDP (volume, % change yoy)





# Irish sovereign bonds delivered best returns in euro area in 2011 and continued normalisation in 2012



Source: Bloomberg (weekly data)





# Ireland's Credit Ratings have stabilised over last year

Rating Agency	Long Term Rating	Outlook
Standard and Poor's	BBB+	Negative
Fitch	BBB+	Negative
Moody's	Ba1	Negative
R & I	BBB+	Negative
DBRS	A (low)	Negative Watch


Source: Bloomberg

Last downgrade was by DBRS in August 2011






# SECTION 1: MACRO



Ireland expected to grow again in 2012; PMIs well above euro area average; but domestic demand weak, thanks to necessary deleveraging



## Rapid recovery in exports since 2009 and resilience continued into 2012




Source: CSO





# Ireland's PMIs held up well in H1 2012 (3mma, >50 = expansion <50 = contraction month on month)




Source: Markit; Bloomberg; NCB





# Ireland's PMI now much stronger than euro area's




Source: Markit; Bloomberg; NCB





# New export orders (from PMI) resilient




Source: Markit; NCB; CSO






# Labour market stabilising, but still weak

### Employment flat for last six months



Source: CSO


### Unemployment rate inching up






# Deleveraging and negative wealth effects also hurting consumer spending

### Net worth per capita (€)




Source: Central Bank; DoEHLG; CSO; NTMA

### Household savings ratio (% DI)





# Consumer spending still declining: back to 2006 levels, but still 80% higher than 15 years ago




Source: CSO







# Housing starts still falling




Source: Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Govt.





# Investment as a % GDP at all-time low



Investment at half of long-run average share of economy

Source: CSO




# Economic forecasts of Irish Government & IMF

	2011	2012F	2013F	2014F	2015F
GNP (% change, volume)	-2.5	-0.2 (-0.1)	1.4 (1.4)	2.3 (2.2)	2.3 (2.4)
GDP (% change, volume)	1.4	0.7 (0.5)	2.2 (1.9)	3.0 (2.6)	3.0 (2.8)
Current Account (% GDP)	1.1	1.1 (0.9)	2.2 (1.8)	3.2 (2.8)	3.7 (3.6)
General Government Debt (% GDP)	106.5	117.5 (117.6)	120.3 (121.2)	119.5 (119.7)	117.4 (116.2)
General Government Balance (% GDP)*	-9.3	-8.3 (-8.3)	-7.5 (-7.5)	-4.8 (-4.7)	-2.8 (-2.9)
Inflation (HICP)	1.1	1.8 (1.7)	1.3 (1.2)	1.5 (1.4)	1.8 (1.6)
Unemployment rate (%)	14.4	14.3 (14.3)	13.6 (13.7)	12.8 (13.0)	11.7 (12.3)

Source: Department of Finance, Stability Programme Update April 2012; \*underlying in 2011 (ex-banking re-cap); IMF forecasts in parenthesis




## SECTION 2: REBALANCING



Ireland has accomplished the bulk of its “internal devaluation”; and outperforms other troubled countries thanks to its flexible economy



# Ireland becoming more competitive and living within its means: current account (% GDP) back in surplus




Source: CSO





# Ireland to benefit more than most from decline in FX value of euro in recent months (goods export shares)




Source: CSO






# Ireland's competitive position vastly different to the other non-core countries

### Unit Labour Costs (Q1 2001=100)



Source: ECB

### Current Account Balance (% GDP)




Source: DataStream





# Price level 13% above EA average at end-2011: lowest since 1999



Source: Eurostat (comparative price levels)





# Ireland is far more open than other non-cores

	Exports (%GDP)	Imports (%GDP)	Openness proxy (X+M/GDP)
Ireland	106	84	1.90
Spain	30	31	0.61
Italy	29	30	0.59
Portugal	35	39	0.75
Greece	21	29	0.50

Source: Datastream (for 2011)






# Ireland has many attractive investment characteristics

- The World Bank Doing Business Report 2011 ranks Ireland 10<sup>th</sup> in the world for ease of doing business
  - 1st in the Euro zone
  - Favourable regulatory environment
- Low Corporate tax rate of 12.5%
- Flexible labour market, availability of skilled labour
  - 1<sup>st</sup> in skilled labour rankings – *IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook 2012*
  - Sharp fall in unit labour costs since 2009
- Low old age dependency ratio
  - 17% in 2011, one of the lowest in Europe
  - Ireland has a young workforce, with nearly 35% of the population under the age of 25 years




# As a result, Ireland has huge stock of inward FDI compared with developed world average



Source: OECD




## SECTION 3: PROPERTY MARKETS



Lack of credit big problem for housing market, notwithstanding improved valuation; Commercial market is attractive to foreign buyers



# Mortgage volumes (actual number) have collapsed




Source: IBF





# Mortgage credit restrictions on the rise again




Source: ECB bank lending survey for Ireland





# National house prices up for first time since September 2007 in May; Dublin up for third month




Source: CSO





# Valuation of housing has adjusted significantly, and is beginning to look reasonable




Source: CSO; ESRI; NTMA







# House prices as a ratio of disposable income per capita nearly back to typical trough of 8-9x




Valuation not back to 1980s lows yet; but nominal and real interest rates lower today

Source: CSO; NTMA





## But private housing rents generally rising in last 12 months (CPI sub-index)




Available supply and demand in balance, but shadow stock remains a concern

Source: CSO





# Commercial property valuations (particularly office and industrial) look attractive versus history




Source: IPD






# Foreign buyers now interested on valuation grounds



Source: IPD; NTMA



## SECTION 4: NAMA ([WWW.NAMA.IE](http://WWW.NAMA.IE))



NAMA well on track to meet end-2013 Troika debt repayment target



# Favourable property market measures: Budget 2012

- **Budget 2012 contained a number of significant measures aimed at boosting the property market**
  - Should help boost NAMAs book of loan assets, underpin collateral in the banking system and may bring forward mortgage demand
- **Stamp duty on Commercial Property cut from 6% to 2%**
  - Now lower than the current UK rate. Should boost overseas demand
- **NAMA can directly approve rent reductions with tenants of commercial properties under its control**
  - Changes to upward-only rent legislation shelved
- **Incentive Scheme**
  - Property bought between today and the end of 2013 will be exempt from CGT on sale as long as it is held for at least seven years
- **Mortgage interest relief raised**
  - Wont be available after 2012. This may bring forward some housing demand
- **Some legacy tax reliefs will be honoured for small buy-to-let investors**
  - This may help to reduce arrears in this troubled part of the mortgage market, all other things equal






## NAMA progress to end May 2012

- Successfully acquired 12,000 loans (over 35,000 individual properties) related to €73.8 billion par of loans relating to 800 debtors for €31.8 billion
- Injected over €30 billion of liquid assets into five participating Irish institutions
- Paid down over €3.6 billion of NAMA debt (€3.3billion NAMA Bonds and €0.3 billion to the State)
- Cash balances of €3.4 billion as at 13<sup>th</sup> July 2012; Over €8.3 billion in cash generated by NAMA since inception
- 2010 Operating profit of €305m before impairment charge of €1,485m; 2011 Operating Profit forecasted to exceed €1billion pre-impairment
- New organisation established from scratch (Almost 210 staff recruited with long standing experience in banking and property)
- Decisions made on debtor business plans relating to €72.5 billion – 98% of portfolio. And 9,900 individual credit decisions made – incl. €1.3billion in development and working capital
- Over €9.2 billion in approved sales as at 31<sup>st</sup> May 2012 (88% outside Ireland)




# NAMA Model





## Summary of bond activity since inception




Source: NAMA

- Senior Notes in issuance at 13<sup>th</sup> July 2012 - €26,970,000,000
- Subordinated Bonds in issuance at 13<sup>th</sup> July 2012 - €1,594,000,000
- Senior debt redemptions of €2 billion on 27 June 2012
- Bond claw-back of c.€0.14 billion in Q1 2012 was due to final due diligence



# Summary of Cash Flows since inception



Source: NAMA

- Total Cash Generated of €8.3 billion between 31 Mar 2010 and 13<sup>th</sup> July 2012
- Includes Principal Repayments €6.5 billion; Interest & other income €1.8 billion
- NAMA Senior Debt Redemptions of €3.25 billion
- Lending disbursement (new advances) of €0.7 billion
- Funding Costs (€0.60 billion) and Miscellaneous /Operating Costs (€0.3 billion)
- Leaving net cash balances of €3.4 billion as at 13<sup>th</sup> July 2012





# NAMA Strategy is three-pronged

- **Financing**
  - ▶ Provide equity capital and credit facilities only where appropriate
  - ▶ NAMA will provide staple/vendor financing on commercial property sales in Ireland
  - ▶ New capital is a scarce resource: it will be advanced by NAMA only where it makes commercial sense and enhances NAMA's financial position
  - ▶ Only undertake development to realise full value of underlying asset
  - ▶ NAMA has approved the advance of over €1.3 billion in working and development capital
- **Asset disposal**
  - ▶ Will be orderly and phased to generate maximum return for taxpayer
  - ▶ There will be no fire sales; neither will assets be held to speculate
  - ▶ NAMA's profitability goal will be consistent with potential growth in the economy, by facilitating functioning property market
  - ▶ 20% of NAMA portfolio is performing. That figure may rise, as business plans are approved or rejected: 98% of business plans by value (€72.5 billion nominal) have been reviewed
- **Debt reduction targets; to reduce contingent liability of the Irish State**
  - ▶ By year-end 2013: €7.5b of NAMA Senior notes to be repaid; By year-end 2020 all of NAMA Senior notes to be repaid



## Distribution of larger debtors

Nominal Debt	Number of debtors	Average nominal debt per debtor €m	Total nominal debt in this category €m
In excess of €2,000m	3	2,758	8,275
Between €1,000 and €2,000m	9	1,549	13,945
Between €500m and €999m	17	674	11,454
Between €250m and €499m	34	347	11,796
Between €100m and €249m	82	152	12,496
Between €50m and €100m	99	68	6,752
Between €20m and €50m	226	32	7,180
Less than €20m	302	7	2,117
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>772</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>74,015</b>

Source: NAMA





# Management of larger debtors

## Largest 190 Debtors – €61billion

Intensively managed by NAMA – key credit decisions and relationship management carried out by NAMA multi-disciplinary teams.

Loan administration performed by participating institutions

## Other 610 Debtors - €13billion

Credit decisions made by NAMA. Cascading system of credit limits and delegated authority: NAMA Board – Credit Committee - NAMA management – NAMA units in banks.

NAMA will have a presence in each of the bank units – day-to-day credit decisions and operations – liaison and oversight role.

Relationship management and loan administration carried out by participating institutions within NAMA parameters.



## Breakdown of original NAMA portfolio (price paid for loan assets)

€billion	Land & Development	% of Total	Investment	% Total	Total book	% Total
Ireland	5.3	57%	12.6	56%	17.9	56%
UK & NI	3.5	38%	8.5	38%	12.0	38%
USA/Europe	0.5	5%	1.4	6%	1.9	6%
<b>Total</b>	<b>9.3</b>	<b>29%</b>	<b>22.5</b>	<b>71%</b>	<b>31.8</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: NAMA

- The portfolio consisted originally of 71% Investment and 29% Land & Development
- The UK and NI accounted for 38% of the portfolio. Assets outside Ireland accounted for 44%
- The most difficult part of the portfolio to monetise is likely to be L&D in Ireland of €5.3billion but Dublin accounts for €3billion of this.
- There is a good chance of realising the remaining €26.5billion from the rest of the portfolio
- Commercial property market rents have undershot in Ireland, while the residential market may deflate further
- Good opportunity to continue to realise value in the UK (excl. NI) in the short term
- Budget 2012 changes may help to put a floor under Irish commercial property values, by restoring confidence and liquidity in time





## Further Information

NAMA information available on [www.nama.ie](http://www.nama.ie)

For more information, requests can be sent to the email address [info@nama.ie](mailto:info@nama.ie)

Receivership information added in July 2011, with monthly updates thereafter.


As at May 2012, website contains details of over 1,271 properties where Receivers / Administrators have been appointed.

Geographical breakdown of these 1,271 properties

77%	ROI
12%	NI
11%	UK



## SECTION 5: BANKING\*



Range of contingent liability for the State narrowed dramatically;  
Deleveraging plan well ahead of target and deposits are growing

\* This section provided by the Banking Unit of the Department of Finance





## Progress since last mission

### Funding

- Deposit levels have increased. Deposit rates are reducing
- Reduction in ECB and ELA funding

### State Support

- Pro-active reduction in ELG support and State guarantees for ELA
- IL&P direction order secured to allow purchase of Irish Life and recap of ptsb

### Competition and State Aid

- BOI Restructuring plan approved
- Updates to AIB draft Restructuring plan submitted

### Deleveraging / bank Models

- Further deleveraging achieved since year end
- Reduction in staff through redundancy programmes commencing

### Mortgage arrears

- Publication of draft heads of Personal insolvency bill.
- Banks mortgage arrears resolution strategies
- Piloting of mortgage to rent scheme


### SME lending

- Pillar banks achieved their €3bn lending targets for 2011
- Commissioned a further SME demand survey
- Seven regional meetings with stakeholders on SME lending and related issues



## Priorities for rest of 2012

### Our focus map





## Restructuring developments


### IBRC and IL&P

- IBRC pro-note discussions continue
- May lead to wider involvement of State banks which would improve the State's ability to exit investments
- Future direction for ptsb decided
  - A good bank will be carved out with a separate asset management unit (AMU)
  - Restructuring plan will be submitted by end June
- State will complete IL&P PCAR requirement through €1.3bn purchase of life company following which the life and banking businesses will be separated




# Update on bank capital

## Core tier 1 ratios for peer European banks



Source : DoF

## Covered banks – balance sheet snapshot



Source : DoF and banks' 2011 accounts


## Comment

- Irish bank capital ratios at end 2011 at top end of European range
- Ratios will come down as further provisions are made
- Capital more than enough to come through cycle




# Ireland's banking crisis in context

## Peak NPL ratios for banking crisis



Source : IMF and DoF (PCAR banks shown for end 2011)

## Recap costs as % of GDP



Source : IMF; for Ireland state recap cost of €63bn used only; total capital raised in system is substantially higher than this


## Comment

- NPL ratios for covered banks at end 2011 are post NAMA loans
- Government has injected nearly €63bn equating to 40% of GDP and this ignores other capital generated through LMEs (€15bn) and self help measures (disposals, private raisings at BOI etc.)




# Mortgage arrears and losses

## Irish 90+ arrears/impaired loans



source: Banks

## Irish House prices




Source: CSO

- Mortgage arrears rose rapidly during 2011 but pace of arrears has slowed in Q1
- Widespread forbearance measures and lack of repossessions a factor as banks put-off resolution of the problem
- Personal insolvency bill will prompt/help banks to comprehensively deal with the issue which will see arrears stabilise and begin to fall
- PCAR provided for €9bn of stressed losses on Irish mortgage books. Arrears running between base and stress




# Update on personal & SME lending activity

## No. new mortgages (FTBs and movers)



Source : IBF

## SME new lending (all banks, €bn)



Source : DOF


## Comment

- Mortgage lending activity rising albeit off a depressed base
- Pillar banks achieved their €3bn SME lending targets in 2011




## Deleveraging is on track

### Covered bank deleveraging - Dec-11



### PLAR bank deleveraging - Dec-11



### Comment

- Total system deleveraging of €46.3bn in 2011
- These figures exclude €1.8bn of transactions that were sale agreed at 31 December 2011 and have largely settled post year end.
- Deleveraging has been achieved within PCAR assumed discounts
- AIB and BOI met their CBI mandated LDR targets at 31 December 2011


Note: 'Planned' is net loan balance reduction anticipated as part of the €70.2bn reduction in PLAR – conversely 'unplanned' is deleveraging not anticipated as part of the €70.2bn outlined in the FMP





## Asset disposals update

### 2011 Target asset disposals versus forecast



### Comment

- In 2011 disposals completed of €14.7bn which by end Q1 2012 had reached €17.6bn.
- The majority of the remaining asset disposals targeted as part of the PLAR plan are located at IL&P
- Excluding IL&P, the Pillar Banks have settled or agreed transactions for 75% of the quantum outlined in the 3 year PLAR plan.



## Main sources of funding for Covered Banks<sup>1</sup>

<b>Central Bank Funding</b> €108 bn	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Reliance on Central Bank Funding is expected to reduce more slowly this year</li><li>• Eurozone risk and Irish economy concerns will continue to weigh on banks ability to find alternative sources of funding</li></ul>
<b>Deposits</b> €149 bn	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Retail and corporate deposits at the Covered Banks have stabilised with Ireland showing genuine growth recently</li><li>• Deposit rates still too high</li></ul>
<b>Wholesale funding</b> €50 bn	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Covered Banks continue to look for opportunities (e.g. UK RMBS market)</li><li>• €13 bn of Covered Bank Debt matures in 2012 if include IBRC</li></ul>
<b>Bilateral Repo</b> €14 bn	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Deals from here generally need to be around Irish collateral. Some large international banks looking at Irish unsecured/secured books</li></ul>
<b>Equity</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Perception of Irish banks makes equity raising difficult.</li><li>• Competition from stronger European banks for scarce resources</li></ul>

1. as at 30th March 2012 (source: CBI)



## State Support for Funding Measures

The Department of Finance has been pursuing **two key policies** in relation to State support over the past 3 months:

- Reducing ELG exposures

*A policy review paper was prepared in January 2012 for January – December 2011 and this led to increased scrutiny of three specific areas with the banks (i) UK deposits (ii) the costs of the guarantees following a review with DG Comp and (iii) potential for normalisation*

- Reducing guarantees supporting ELA


*The Department determined that the level of the contingent exposure was greater than required*

- A more pro-active approach will see DoF vigorously engage with the banks to determine a speedy but prudent approach to wean them off ELG over a realistic timeframe as 2012 progresses
- Questions being asked?
  - How much value do customers put on the guarantee post heavy bank recapitalisation?
  - Is the guarantee needed for demand deposits or just term deposits or both?



## State Support continues to fall


### Changes in CIFS/ELG since inception





# Central Bank Funding remains on a downward trend

## Funding trend since end 2010



Source: Central Bank of Ireland


## Key Observations

- CBF has declined modestly this year
- Little deleveraging activity in Q1 while debt maturities kicked in.
- With the exception of some investment by BOI, Irish banks did not really play 'the carry trade' in the LTRO's




## Covered Banks relative usage of ECB facilities down significantly

### Covered Bank Usage of ECB Facilities



Source: CBI, ECB Statistical Warehouse

### ECB & ELA Usage by Country




Source: CSFB

- Covered Banks' usage of ECB facilities has significantly fallen on a relative basis:
  - Covered Banks' usage of the total ECB facilities has reduced to 7% from 18%
  - Total usage had fallen to €65 bn at end March from peak of €93 bn
- Irish usage of ECB facilities has fallen at a time when other Eurozone members have drawn more heavily – contagion across the Eurozone system



## Covered Banks relative deposit position


### Covered Bank share of deposit market



### Key observations

- BoI have moved rates decisively downwards
- Other Covered Banks have followed but perhaps to a lesser extent
- Covered banks have regained some lost market share according to CBI unconsolidated stats.
- Overseas banks still aggressive
  - Rabodirect offers 2.4% on demand with Nationwide and Leeds both offering 3%
  - KBC recently raised demand rate to 3.25% and 1 year rate to 4.15%


## SECTION 6: FISCAL & FUNDING



Fiscal trends improving: further two-year challenge to stabilise debt ratio



# Planned gross annual fiscal consolidation to 2015 (€bn), the target year to meet 3% of GDP deficit rule




Source: Department of Finance; IMF





# Gains from 2001-07 bubble lost, but living standards still almost 50% better than at start of genuine boom




Source: CSO





# General Government revenue (€bn) has stabilised at levels between 2004 and 2005




Source: Department of Finance; Eurostat





# Ireland not far from confirming debt sustainability



Source: Department of Finance: SPU, April 2012; Eurostat



# Ireland's fiscal challenge to stabilise debt ratio easier on paper than for similar small countries in the past


	Years	Turnaround required in Primary Balance (% of GDP)	GDP (% chg. real)	GDP (% chg. nom)
Belgium (1981-1990)	9	12.3	2.3	5.8
Denmark (1982-1986)	4	14.1	3.9	9.2
Finland (1993-2000)	7	13.5	4.5	6.7
Sweden (1993-2000)	7	12.6	3.7	5.4
Ireland (1982-1991)	9	12.0	3.6	8.2
Ireland (2009-2014F)*	5	<b>10.1</b>	1.2	1.3

Source: NTMA

Ireland is halfway through the process, but it is politically difficult to consolidate when inflation is low and private debt high




# Rollovers of bonds light in 2012 and 2013 (€bn)



Source: NTMA



## Total funding requirement declining steadily (€bn)



Source: NTMA; Department of Finance



# Foreign ownership of marketable bonds is high

€ million

End quarter	June 2011	September 2011	December 2011	March 2012
1. Resident	15,929	18,407	18,864	18,755
– MFIs and Central Bank	12,868	15,441	15,665	17,158
– General government	890	879	806	349
– Financial intermediaries	1,912	1,822	2,157	1,043
i) Financial auxiliaries	309	333	337	445
ii) Insurance corporations and pension funds	1,331	1,147	1,192	453
iii) Other financial intermediaries	272	341	627	146
– Non Financial Corporations	31	48	12	10
– Households	228	217	224	195
2. Rest of world	73,697	71,182	66,446	<b>60,896 (76.5%)</b>
Total	89,626	89,589	85,310	79,651


Source: Central Bank of Ireland








# Gross Government debt stabilises below 120% of GDP in 2013, as nominal GDP revised up for 2011



Source: Department of Finance: SPU, April 2012; CSO (new National Accounts)



# APPENDIX



Additional banking data

# Summary balance sheets of “covered banks” year-end 2011 (including consolidated IBRC)


€m	AIB	BOI	IBRC	ILP	
As at:	30-Dec-11	30-Dec-11	30-Dec-11	30-Dec-11	Total
<b>Assets:</b>					
Loans and advances to customers*	82,540	99,314	17,689	33,677	233,220
Promissory notes	-	-	29,934	-	29,934
NAMA notes	19,856	5,016	0	-	24,872
Loans and advances to banks	5,718	8,059	2,306	1,623	17,706
Available for sale assets	15,589	12,708	3,859	28,900	61,056
Other assets	10,016	21,602	1,653	7,749	41,020
Cash	2,932	8,181	100	88	11,301
<b>Total assets</b>	<b>136,651</b>	<b>154,880</b>	<b>55,541</b>	<b>72,037</b>	<b>419,109</b>
<b>Liabilities:</b>					
Deposits from banks	36,890	31,534	42,591	16,966	127,981
Customer accounts	63,932	70,506	597	14,373	149,408
Debt securities in issue	15,654	19,124	5,371	8,356	48,505
Subordinated liabilities	1,209	1,426	304	317	3,256
Other liabilities		10,047		680	18,670
Other Liabilities - Life	4,503	11,991	3,440	27,828	39,819
<b>Total liabilities</b>	<b>122,188</b>	<b>144,628</b>	<b>52,303</b>	<b>68,520</b>	<b>387,639</b>
<b>Total equity</b>	<b>14,463</b>	<b>10,252</b>	<b>3,238</b>	<b>3,517</b>	<b>31,470</b>
<b>Total liabilities and equity</b>	<b>136,651</b>	<b>154,880</b>	<b>55,541</b>	<b>72,037</b>	<b>419,109</b>

Source: Department of Finance; Published accounts as at 31/12/11





# European banks' capital levels (Core tier 1 comparison)



Source: Datastream; GS Research; Company Reports



# Loan book analysis

<b>Total loans (€bn)</b>	<b>AIB</b>	<b>BOI</b>	<b>ILP</b>	<b>Total</b>
Residential mortgages	45	57	33	135
Corporate	8	12	0	19
SME	16	15	0	31
CRE	25	21	2	47
other	5	3	1	9
<b>Total (Dec 2011)</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>108</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>241</b>

Source: Company Data Annual Reports

<b>Mortgage analysis (€bn)</b>	<b>AIB</b>	<b>BOI</b>	<b>ILP</b>	<b>Total</b>
Irish owner occupier	32	21	20	72
Irish Buy-to-let	10	7	6	23
<b>Total Irish</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>95</b>
UK owner occupier	3	15	0	20
UK Buy-to-let	0	12	7	19
<b>Total UK</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>39</b>
<b>Total residential mortgages (Dec 2011)</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>135</b>

Source: Annual Reports



# Central bank 2011 - 2013 projected losses under adverse scenario

## Projected stressed losses derived from bottom-up analysis of loan data by Blackrock Solution

€bn	<u>AIB</u>	<u>BOI</u>	<u>ILP</u>	<u>EBS</u>	<u>Total</u>
Residential mortgages	3	2.4	2.7	1.4	9.5
Corporate	1	1.1	0	0	2.1
SME	2.7	1.8	0	0	4.5
CRE	4.5	3.9	0.4	0.2	9.0
other	<u>1.4</u>	<u>0.9</u>	<u>0.3</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2.6</u>
<b>Total</b>	<b>12.6</b>	<b>10.1</b>	<b>3.4</b>	<b>1.6</b>	<b>27.7</b>
<b>% of loan book</b>					
Residential mortgages	9.9%	3.9%	7.9%	8.7%	6.7%
Corporate	4.7%	5.2%	0.0%	0.0%	4.9%
SME	13.9%	10.6%	0.0%	0.0%	12.3%
CRE	26.2%	18.8%	19.5%	23.4%	22.1%
other	25.0%	16.4%	20.7%	0.0%	20.7%
<b>Total</b>	<b>13.4%</b>	<b>8.0%</b>	<b>9.1%</b>	<b>9.4%</b>	<b>10.1%</b>

Source: PCAR 2011

- The €27.7bn of projected losses is significantly more conservative than the banks' own forecast provisions over the same period (c. €22bn) and is designed to add to the credibility of the tests
- The losses are projected on a "repossess and sale" approach using stressed property values with little recognition of customer repayment capacity, incorporating the write-down experience of foreign jurisdictions (UK repossession levels)
- Negative equity (as opposed to unemployment levels) had a large bearing on forecast residential loan losses
- Modelled rental income declines assumed on commercial real estate (with little regard to sustainable cash flows from actual lease contracts)



# Projected adverse case losses by bank and portfolio used for capital purposes (derived from BlackRock analysis)

Product		AIB	BOI	ILP	EBS	Total	
Residential Mortgages	BlackRock lifetime loan losses post-deleveraging	4,908 (15.8%)	4,286 (7.2%)	5,209 (15.4%)	2,495 (15.7%)	9,925 (7.1%)	16,898 (12%)
	CB three-year projected losses	3,066 (9.9%)	2,366 (3.9%)	2,679 (7.9%)	1,380 (8.7%)	5,838 (4.1%)	9,491 (6.7%)
Corporate	BlackRock lifetime loan losses post-deleveraging	1,133 (5.5%)	1,379 (6%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1,608 (3.7%)	2,512 (5.8%)
	CB three-year projected losses	972 (4.7%)	1,179 (5.2%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1,362 (3.1%)	2,151 (4.9%)
SME	BlackRock lifetime loan losses post-deleveraging	4,085 (21.2%)	2,871 (16.6%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	5,398 (14.8%)	6,956 (19%)
	CB three-year projected losses	2,674 (13.9%)	1,837 (10.6%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	3,603 (9.9%)	4,511 (12.3%)
CRE	BlackRock lifetime loan losses post-deleveraging	4,717 (27.5%)	4,950 (24.2%)	411 (20.1%)	225 (26.7%)	8,114 (20.1%)	10,303 (25.5%)
	CB three-year projected losses	4,490 (26.2%)	3,847 (18.8%)	400 (19.5%)	197 (23.4%)	7,159 (17.7%)	8,934 (22.1%)
Non-mortgage Consumer and Other	BlackRock lifetime loan losses post-deleveraging	1,674 (29.8%)	1,332 (24.5%)	444 (26.8%)	0 (0%)	2,477 (19.5%)	3,450 (27.1%)
	CB three-year projected losses	1,403 (25%)	891 (16.4%)	342 (20.7%)	0 (0%)	2,052 (16.1%)	2,635 (20.7%)
Total	BlackRock lifetime loan losses post-deleveraging	16,517 (17.6%)	14,819 (11.8%)	6,064 (16.1%)	2,719 (16.3%)	27,522 (10%)	40,119 (14.6%)
	CB three-year projected losses	12,604 (13.4%)	10,119 (8%)	3,421 (9.1%)	1,577 (9.4%)	20,014 (7.3%)	27,722 (10.1%)

Source: PCAR 2011



# Projected adverse case mortgage book losses used for capital purposes derived from BlackRock

		AIB	BOI	ILP	EBS	Total
Ireland	BlackRock lifetime loan losses post-deleveraging	4,846 (17.6%)	3,836 (13.7%)	5,103 (19.4%)	2,495 (15.7%)	16,280 (16.7%)
	CB three-year projected losses	3,007 (10.9%)	2,016 (7.2%)	2,594 (9.9%)	1,380 (8.7%)	8,997 (9.2%)
Owner Occupier	BlackRock lifetime loan losses post-deleveraging	2,968 (14.7%)	2,075 (9.9%)	2,975 (15.3%)	2,164 (15.5%)	10,181 (13.7%)
	CB three-year projected losses	1,791 (8.9%)	1,115 (5.3%)	1,598 (8.2%)	1,164 (8.3%)	5,668 (7.6%)
Buy-to-Let	BlackRock lifetime loan losses post-deleveraging	1,879 (25.5%)	1,761 (24.9%)	2,128 (30.8%)	331 (17.1%)	6,099 (26.2%)
	CB three-year projected losses	1,216 (16.5%)	901 (12.7%)	996 (14.4%)	216 (11.2%)	3,330 (14.3%)
UK	BlackRock lifetime loan losses post-deleveraging	62 (1.8%)	451 (1.4%)	106 (1.4%)	0 (-)	619 (1.4%)
	CB three-year projected losses	59 (1.7%)	350 (1.1%)	85 (1.1%)	0 (-)	494 (1.1%)
Owner Occupier	BlackRock lifetime loan losses post-deleveraging	37 (1.2%)	112 (0.6%)	6 (1.3%)	0 (-)	156 (0.7%)
	CB three-year projected losses	34 (1.1%)	92 (0.5%)	5 (1.1%)	0 (-)	131 (0.6%)
Buy-to-Let	BlackRock lifetime loan losses post-deleveraging	25 (5.2%)	338 (2.9%)	100 (1.4%)	0 (-)	462 (2.4%)
	CB three-year projected losses	25 (5.3%)	259 (2.2%)	79 (1.1%)	0 (-)	363 (1.9%)
Total Residential Mortgages	BlackRock lifetime loan losses post-deleveraging	4,908 (15.8%)	4,286 (7.2%)	5,209 (15.4%)	2,495 (15.7%)	16,898 (12.0%)
	CB three-year projected losses	3,066 (9.9%)	2,366 (3.9%)	2,679 (7.9%)	1,380 (8.7%)	9,491 (6.7%)

Source: PCAR 2011





# Huge gross cost to the Irish State of Banking clean-up

€bn	AIB/EBS	Bol*	IL&P***	IBRC	Total
Government preference Shares (2009) - NPRF	3.5	3.5	-	-	7.0
Capital contributions (Promissory Notes /Special Investment Shares (2010) - Exchequer **	0.9	-	-	30.7	31.6
Ordinary Share Capital (2009) - Exchequer	-	-	-	4.0	4.0
Ordinary Share Capital (2010) - NPRF	3.7	-	-	-	3.7
<b>Total pre-PCAR 2011 (A)</b>	<b>8.1</b>	<b>3.5</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>34.7</b>	<b>46.3</b>
<b>PCAR 2011:</b>					
Capital from Exchequer	3.9	-	2.7	-	6.5
NPRF Capital	8.8	1.2	-	-	10.0
<b>Total PCAR (B)</b>	<b>12.7</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>2.7</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>16.5</b>
<b>Total Cost of Recap for State (A) + (B)</b>	<b>20.7</b>	<b>4.7</b>	<b>2.7</b>	<b>34.7</b>	<b>62.8</b>

\*€1.7bn of Bol's government preference shares were converted to equity in May/June 2010 (€1.8bn still left in existence). The government also received €479m from the warrants and €403m in dividend income from preference shares.

\*\* The IBRC (Anglo/INBS) amount is made up of a total capital contribution for Anglo / INBS of €30.6bn and a special investment share of €0.1bn (INBS).

\*\*\* In addition, the State is committed to acquiring Irish Life for €1.3bn to complete the recapitalisation of Irish Life & Permanent. It is expected that the proceeds of an onward sale of Irish Life in due course will reduce the amount the State has committed to the bank recapitalisation.

Source: Department of Finance

