### Ireland: Begins 2020 in best shape since early 2000s

Second straight budget surplus in 2019

January 2020



#### Index

Page 3: Summary

Page 8: Macro

Page 23: Fiscal & NTMA funding

Page 38: Brexit

Page 46: Long-term fundamentals


Page 57: Property


Page 63: Other Data


Page 72: Annex (GDP distortions explainer)



#### Domestic economy growing: averaging 4%+ since 2014









#### Ireland is improving its debt sustainability year-by-year

### Two years of budget surplus (€bn)



### Ireland is improving its debt dynamics by the month


Debt-to-GNI\* (100% 2019f, from 166% peak)

Debt-to-GG Revenue (243% 2019f, from 353%)

Average interest rate (2.3% 2019f, from 5.1%)

Debt-to-GDP<sup>^</sup> (59% 2019f, from 120%)

#### Debt headed below 100% of national income





#### Main risks are external and outside of Ireland's control

### Brexit

Deal is likely to be passed in UK parliament meaning the immediate risk is gone.

The catch for Ireland is that Britain reverts to WTO rules in the end and diverges from EU regs.

### US

Ireland is still a "high beta" bet on the US economy, in particular its ICT sector.

US is in the late stage of its economic cycle, although interest rate cuts may extend its duration

### Tax

Corporation tax reform may impact Ireland's economic model in the medium term.

The OECD BEPS II process is set to be completed by end 2020

#### Funding range of €10-14bn for 2020 – down from 2019

### €10-14bn

Funding range is €10-14bn for the coming year

in 2020, so the NTMA will run down some of its cash buffer

## 10 years


One of the longest weighted average maturities in Europe

The NTMA used ECB QE to extend debt maturity, reduce interest cost and repay the IMF

#### AA-


Ireland has been upgrade to AA space by S&P

Ireland's debt sustainability has been improving and Brexit risk has receded




# Labour market best illustrates Ireland's growth story – Ireland is close to full employment

Unemployment rate: down to 4.8% in December 2019 from peak of 16%




### Employment growth consistently above 2%; average net jobs increase of 15K a quarter



## High-skill employment an important driver; though labour participation rate has been slow to recover

### High-skill employment has grown sharply (index, 100 = end 2008)




### Labour participation has not yet fully recovered as young stay in school




#### Wage growth evident in 2019 but uneven across sectors

### Wage growth a driver for increase in compensation of employees...



#### ... but disparities remain across sectors




- 4Q average hourly earnings y-o-y Q2 2019
- ◆ 2019 Q3 average annual earnings (€000, RHS)



# Despite being late cycle, inflation is low; Ireland's *Phillips*Curve might be starting to bite

### Inflation (%) in Ireland similar to rest of euro area currently – Brexit ref. impact has gone



Source: CSO, Eurostat

#### Gníomhaireacht Bainistíochta an Chisteáin Náisiúnta National Treasury Management Agency


### At full employment, wage growth could become an issue if Brexit outcome is benign



Source: CSO, NTMA analysis; Non-Agriculture employment /wage data on yearly basis (1999-2018)

# GDP distortions mean we need to look to other metrics; Irish recovery evident when looking at GNI\*

GNI\* was €197bn in 2018; 7.3% higher than in 2017 (current prices or cash basis)




GNI\* growth rate averaged 8% in 2013-2018 (current prices or cash basis)




## When looking for price-adjusted timely data, modified final domestic demand is the best measure

### In real terms underlying growth in Ireland averaged 4.3% since 2014




### MFDD measure driven by consumption; investment slowed by Brexit uncertainty






# Economy has been driven by multinational growth – in particular ICT; tech grew 26% in year to Sept 2019

### Breakdown of the Irish economy by sector – Industry (pharma) and ICT are 40% of GVA



### Information and communication sector has expanded rapidly in recent years






## Manufacturing is declining like elsewhere in the world; services are robust but growth has decelerated

#### Manufacturing PMIs across the globe declined in 2019


Country	PMI Dec 2018	PMI Dec 2019
EU	51.5	46.4 ↓
France	49.7	50.4
Germany	51.5	43.7 👃
Italy	49.2	46.2 👃
Japan	52.6	48.4 ↓
Spain	51.1	47.4 👃
UK	54.3	47.5
US	53.8	52.4 👃
World	51.4	50.1 👃

### Ireland's PMIs slipping much like rest of globe – services above 50 however




#### Consumer spending growth consistent around 3%

### Private consumption expanded by 3.3% in 2018 – steady trend emerging




### Ireland's consuming faster than Euro Area peers




## Crucially the recovery was not driven by credit; debt reduction ended as recently as 2018

### Lending for house purchase only edging into positive territory




### Modified investment led solely by building & construction; mach. & equipment is sluggish






## Private debt levels remain elevated but Ireland has used recovery period to repair balance sheets

### Household debt ratio has decreased due to deleveraging and increasing incomes



### Legacy of crisis is on the Government balance sheet not the private sector's




Source: <u>CBI</u>






# Savings rate around EU average – pointing towards households being more prudent

### Gross household saving rate lower than peak but close to EU average



### Interest burden down to well below 4% of disposable income from peak of 11%






## External environment worst since 2012 for Ireland? Brexit deal would alleviate short term risks


	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020f
EA Monetary Policy	Accommodative	Accommodative	Accommodative	Less accommodative	Accommodative in Q4	Accommodative
US Monetary Policy	Accommodative	Accommodative	Accommodative but tightening	Further tightening	Easing	Easy policy continuing
US growth	Stimulative	Less stimulative	Stimulative	Stimulative due to fiscal package	YC inversion, but still growing	Labour market strength
Oil price	Falling	Falling	Rising	Falling	Flat y-o-y	Rising on tensions?
UK growth	Stimulative	Less favourable; Brexit impact	Growth slowing	Growth slowing	Brexit risks	Brexit risks reduced for 2020
Euro Growth	Stimulative	Stimulative	Stimulative	Slowing growth	Sluggish	Unimpressive
Euro currency	Very Helpful	Helpful	Headwind	Neutral	No change y-o-y v. £; weaker v \$	Neutral?

## Export growth has rebounded in 2019; Ireland is living within its means

### Goods exports outside MNC-dominated sectors rebounding (y-o-y change)



#### Current account is distorted heavily by MNEs: modified CA is consistent with GNI\*






Nominal values, exports excludes contract manufacturing.

Modified CA=CA less (IP Depreciation + Aircraft Leasing Depreciation + Redomiciled Incomes + R&D Services Exports) adding back (Imports of related to Leasing Aircraft + R&D related IP and services Imports). Significant caution should be exercised when viewing Ireland's current account data. MNC's action distort metrics heavily.





#### Funding range of €10-14bn for 2020 – down from 2019

### €10-14bn

Funding range is €10-14bn for the coming year

in 2020, so the NTMA will run down some of its cash buffer

## 10 years

One of the longest weighted average maturities in Europe


The NTMA used ECB QE to extend debt maturity, reduce interest cost and repay the IMF

#### AA-

Ireland has been upgrade to AA space by S&P

Ireland's debt sustainability has been improving and Brexit risk has receded

## Maturity profile: IMF repayment and FRN buy-backs have reduced refinancing risk; Green diversifies investor base






Source: NTMA

Note: EFSM loans are subject to a 7-year extensions. It is not expected that Ireland will refinance any of its EFSM loans before 2027. As such we have placed the pre-2027 EFSM loan maturity dates in the 2027-30 range although these may be subject to change.

#### The NTMA took advantage of QE to extend debt profile

### Various operations have extended the maturity of Government debt ...



Source: NTMA: ECB

### ...Ireland (in years) now compares favourably to other EU countries






#### Funding requirements will be met by mix of new issuance and rundown of cash

Two bonds mature in 2020, the first in April and the second in October.

Four of the remaining five tranches of the UK bilateral loan mature in 2020.

Exchequer Borrowing Requirement could be smaller than estimated if Brexit withdrawal agreement is ratified by UK.

Existing cash balances will be run down to meet part of the 2020 funding requirement.




#### Notes:

Short Term Paper (ST paper) = Net growth in marketable short-term debt (Treasury Bills and Commercial Paper). Intra Govt.funds = Expected growth in funding from domestic public sector sources.


Other funding requirements includes general contingency provision e.g. for potential Floating Rate Note purchases. Other sources Includes other cash inflows and expected European Investment Bank loan drawdowns. Mid-point of €10bn-€14bn bond funding range is used for illustrative purposes.

## ECB policy and NTMA's funding strategy have lowered the State's interest burden

NTMA issued €69bn MLT debt since 2015; 14.1 yr. weighted maturity; avg. rate of 1.04%




Interest costs forecasted pre-QE to be c.€10bn; will drop below €5bn by end 2019






## Diverse holders of Irish debt – sticky sources account for over 50%

### Ireland roughly split 80/20 on non-resident versus resident holdings (H1 '19)



### "Sticky" sources - official loans, Eurosystem, retail - make up over 50% of Irish debt







Source: CSO, Eurostat, CBI, ECB, NTMA Analysis
IGBs excludes those held by Eurosystem. Eurosystem holdings include SMP, PSPP and CBI holdings of
FRNs. Figures do not include ANFA. Other debt Includes IMF, EFSF, EFSM, Bilateral as well as IBRCrelated liabilities. Retail includes State Savings and other currency and deposits. The CSO series has
been altered to exclude the impact of IBRC on the data.

#### Investor base for Government bonds is wide and varied

### Investor breakdown: Average over last 5 syndications




### Country breakdown: Average over last 5 syndications






# Late cycle risks mixed for Ireland: yield curve sets recession clock ticking but central banks are now easing

US yield curve has inverted (albeit only slightly so far): could be waiting a while yet




PSPP restarting + re-investment means ECB will be active In IGBs in 2020




## Ireland recorded full budget surplus for first time in 11 years in 2018: another one likely for 2019

### Gen. Govt. Balance in surplus but might slip into deficit in case of no-deal Brexit




### Revenue surge has helped Ireland balance the books since 2015 (€bn)






# Ireland has improved its debt dynamics: next step is to follow others and run a GGB surplus for many years

### In recent years Ireland has run primary surpluses that reduced debt ratios




### 2019 GGB Deficit/Surplus (% of GDP) forecasts; Ireland moving up the ranks






# Gross Government debt likely close to 59% of GDP at end-2019; 100% of GNI\*; reality somewhere in between

### Ireland's net debt position converging with gross debt as EDP assets are run down



### Debt-to-GNI\* ratio is high but has declined quickly




#### It's best to analyse Irish debt with broad range of metrics

2018	GG debt to GG revenue %	GG interest to GG rev %	GG debt to GDP %
Greece	377.9%	6.3%	181.2%
Italy	291.7%	7.6%	134.8%
Portugal	284.1%	7.5%	122.2%
Cyprus	256.5%	6.0%	100.6%
Ireland	<u>250.2%</u>	<u>5.7%</u>	<u>63.6%</u>
Spain	249.1%	5.9%	97.6%
UK	219.3%	5.9%	85.9%
Belgium	194.7%	3.9%	100.0%
EA19	184.7%	3.7%	85.9%
France	183.9%	2.9%	98.4%
EU28	178.4%	3.8%	80.4%
Slovenia	158.9%	3.9%	70.4%
Austria	151.4%	3.1%	74.0%
Germany	133.2%	1.9%	61.9%
Netherlands	120.3%	1.9%	52.4%




# Corporation tax revenue keeps surprising positively, but each year the concentration risk increases

### Corporation tax receipts have more than doubled in four years



### Sectors with large MNC presence dominate the CT receipts




### S&P restores "AA" grade – for first time in a decade

Rating Agency	Long- term	Short- term	Outlook/ Trend	Date of last change
Standard & Poor's	AA-	A-1+	Stable	Nov 2019
Fitch Ratings	A+	F1+	Stable	Dec 2017
Moody's	A2	P-1	Stable	Sept 2017
DBRS	A(high)	R-1 (middle)	Stable	March 2016
R&I	А	a-1	Stable	Jan. 2017

€ Billion	2016	2017	2018
Currency and deposits (mainly retail debt)	21.3	21.6	21.6
Securities other than shares, exc. financial derivatives	124.2	130.7	134.2
- Short-term (T-Bills, CP etc)	2.4	2.9	3.1
- Long-term (MLT bonds)	121.8	127.8	131.1
Loans	55.2	49.0	50.3
- Short-term	0.7	0.5	0.6
- Long-term (official funding)	54.6	48.5	49.7
General Government Debt	200.7	201.3	205.9
EDP debt instrument assets	24.9	27.3	28.6
Net Government debt	175.8	174.0	177.3





# Brexit deal solves many issues for Ireland but does not eliminate the risk of a hard Brexit

## Northern Ireland border issued solved if current deal is ratified by UK parliament

- Northern Ireland will remain within the UK Customs Union but will abide by EU Customs Union rules – dual membership for NI.
- No hard border on the island of Ireland customs border will be in the Irish sea. Goods crossing from ROI to NI will not require checks but goods going to UK will.
- Complex arrangements will be necessary to differentiate between goods going to NI and those travelling through NI to UK or vice versa. Customs checks at ports, VAT and tariff rebates and alignment of regulations will be needed.
- All of this is backed by a complex consent mechanism, which allows Stormont to opt-out under simple majority at certain times.

## UK-EU Future trading relationship unresolved

- After the withdrawal agreement is sorted we enter the transition period, which is slated to finish at the end of 2020.
- The UK government has stated its intention to seek a free-trade arrangement for the long term.
- This is a departure from Theresa May's government position which kept all of the UK in the EU customs union and kept many regulations aligned.
- The upshot is that the trading relationship will be more distant, making negotiations difficult.
- There is only one year to negotiate what normally takes several years. <u>Risk of hard Brexit if the</u> transition period is not extended.

# Negatives of hard Brexit outweigh positives in short-term, although opportunities may appear longer term

#### Cons

#### Short term

- Major trade disruption from tariffs, customs checks and documentation (red tape)
- Regions suffer severe recession in agriculture and UK-focused manufacturing; tourism might suffer
- Confidence shock to business and households
- Liquidity may dry up in property market
- Fiscal surplus will turn to deficit, challenging 3% of GDP limit in worst case

#### Long term

- Lower consumer spending thanks to higher inflation when tariffs dominate the FX benefit
- Political economy cost (loss of ally in the EU)

#### **Pros**

#### Short term

None, bar cheaper domestic food prices?

#### Long term

- Fiscal help from Europe is likely; selective temporary waiving of State Aid rules?
- FDI influx from UK, as multinationals avoid turmoil;
   UK's reputation might be tarnished
  - Financial services (passporting lost by UK)
  - Other multinationals especially IT and business services
- Commercial property occupancy could rise; there may also be an influx of well paid workers
- Gradual partial trade recovery
  - Irish companies may steal EU market share from British ones (and finally diversify)
  - Import substitution (especially in food)



# Whichever type of Brexit materialises, trade is likely to be negatively impacted

% of tota		Goods (2018)			Services (2018)		Total (2018)	
		Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	
US		27.9	18.5	11.6	25.4	18.	23.1	
<u>UK*</u>	-	<u>11.5</u>	21.7	<u>15.7</u>	9.6	<u>13.8</u>	<u>13.6</u>	
NI		1.6	1.6	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	
EU-2	7	38.8	37.4	29.4	26.8	33.5	30.3	
China	а	3.9	5.9	2.6	1.5	3.1	3.0	
Othe	r	21.8	22.4	43.3	38.3	30.7	31.1	

#### Irish/UK trade linkages will suffer following Brexit

- The UK is the second largest single-country export destination for Ireland's goods and the largest for its services
- At the same time, Ireland imports c. 20% of its goods from the UK.


#### Ireland's trade with the UK is labour intensive

 The UK might only account for 14% of Ireland's total exports, but Ireland is more dependent than that because those UKreliant sectors are labour intensive


SMEs account for over 55% of Irish exports to the UK. They are likely to be more adversely affected than larger companies by the introduction of tariffs and barriers to trade

#### Agri-food and tourism most at risk from trade barriers

#### Agriculture has not diversified from the UK




#### Tourism numbers linked to FX moves






# Fan chart of hard Brexit impact on Ireland – the most severe forecast puts Ireland into recession

## The hit from the baseline for various forecasts of a hard Brexit



## Impact on GNI\* growth under various forecasts of hard Brexit





# Hard Brexit impact estimates all show similar story – return to WTO rules would be negative for Ireland

Forecast vs. no Brexit baseline	Short term (2 years)	Medium term (5 years)	Long term (10-15 years)
Department of Finance (ESRI)	-2.4%	-3.3%	-5.0%
Copenhagen Economics	-2.0 to 2.5%	-4.5%	-7.0% (of which -4.9% is due to regulatory divergence)
Central Bank of Ireland	-4.0%	-	-6.0%
Bank of England "disruptive" (implied)	-5.0%	-6.2%	-6.2%
Bank of England "disorderly" (implied)	-6.3%	-8.2%	-8.2%
UK Treasury range (implied)	-	-	-5.0 to 7.2%



# Many financial institutions have already announced that they will expand or set up in Dublin after Brexit

#### FDI: Ireland may benefit

- Ireland could be a beneficiary from displaced FDI.
   The chief areas of interest are
  - Financial services
  - Business services
  - IT/ new media.
- Dublin is primarily competing with Frankfurt,
   Paris, Luxembourg and Amsterdam for financial services.
- Ireland's FDI opportunity will depend on the outcome of post-exit trade negotiations. The UK (City of London) is almost certain to lose its EU passporting rights on exit, so there may be more opportunities in time.

## Companies that have indicated jobs to be moved to Ireland







J.P.Morgan



















# Much rebalancing has taken place – Ireland's structural growth drivers have reasserted

## Gross National Income\* at current prices (1995=100)




# Ireland's GNI\* per capita hit 2007 levels and compares favourably to EA




#### Ireland's population profile healthier than the EU average

## Ireland's population was 4.92m in 2019 – over 200,000 more than 2011 Census




## Ireland's population will remain younger than most of its EA counterparts




# Favourable population characteristics underpin debt sustainability over longer term: next 10 years look healthy

## Percentage of population: Ireland's has relatively more young people and fewer old



## The consequence is that working-age population expected to grow (2020-2029)




Source: Oxford Economics forecasts




Source: Eurostat

#### Openness to immigration has been beneficial to Ireland

## Latest Census data show net migration positive since 2015 – mirroring economy




## Highly educated migrants moving to Ireland "Reverse Brain Drain"





# Openness to trade is also central to Irish success – led by services exports; Brexit may hinder export-led growth

## Cumulative post-crisis total exports (4Q sum to end-2008 = 100, current prices)




## Ireland benefits from export diversification by destination

% of total	Goods (2018)		Services (2018)		Total (2018)	
	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.
US	27.9	18.5	11.6	25.4	18.	23.1
<u>UK*</u>	<u>11.5</u>	21.7	<u>15.7</u>	9.6	<u>13.8</u>	<u>13.6</u>
NI	1.6	1.6	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
EU-27	38.8	37.4	29.4	26.8	33.5	30.3
China	3.9	5.9	2.6	1.5	3.1	3.0
Other	21.8	22.4	43.3	38.3	30.7	31.1




# Ireland is relatively competitive now; we need to avoid repeat of the mid-2000s

#### Nominal Labour Cost Ratio - IE vs Euro Area



## Unemployment back towards 1999-2007 level, but wage growth lower




Source: CSO, Eurostat, NTMA calculations

Source: Eurostat, NTMA analysis \*Ratio = IE Nom. Labour Costs/ EA Nom. Labour Costs



#### Ireland is a good place to live and do business


#### Ireland is close to OECD norms socially



## Ireland scores well on metrics such as property rights and government efficiency

UN Goal – Peace, Justice and Strong institutions	Ireland Actual Figure	Ireland Normalised (world leader = 100)	OECD Average
Overall	-	87.5	75.8
Corruption Perception Index (0-100)	73.0	79.4	73.5
Government Efficiency (1-7)	4.8	<u>74.8</u>	<u>52.8</u>
Homicides (per 100,000 people)	1.1	97.8	96.1
Prison population (per 100,000 people)	80.0	87.8	74.6
Property Rights (1-7)	6.1	94.8	<u>73.1</u>
Population who feel safe walking alone at night (%)	75.0	73.7	67.4

# Income equality – Ireland's very progressive system means income equality is around OECD average after tax



Source: OECD

# Ireland reformed its corporate tax code to meet global standards; the 12.5% rate is fixed Government policy

## Ireland's part in OECD (BEPS 1.0) corporate tax reform

- Ireland has been a strong supporter of the BEPS process since inception.
- Removal of known tax avoidance structures such as the "Double Irish", "the Single Malt" and "stateless companies".
- Ireland is best in class on tax transparency and exchange of information. Ireland is one of only 23 jurisdictions to have been found to be fully compliant with new international best practice by the Global Forum on Tax Transparency and Exchange of Information.
- Ireland introduced Country-by-Country Reporting in 2015. The State also ratified the BEPS multilateral instrument in domestic legislation which will update the majority of Ireland's tax treaties to be BEPS compliant.

## Ireland's role in EU actions on corporate tax reform

- Ireland agreed two Anti-Tax Avoidance Directives
   (ATADs) with its fellow EU Member States in 2016
   and 2017. The Anti-Tax Avoidance Directives
   represent binding commitments to implement
   three significant BEPS recommendations into Irish
   law as well as two additional anti-avoidance
   measures.
- Three out of five required components of the ATADs are now in effect as of 1st Jan 2019: Controlled-Foreign Company (CFC) rules, Exit Tax and General Anti-Abuse Rules (GAAR).
- Ireland continues to engage positively at both EU and OFCD level on tax issues.

# OECD's BEPS 2.0 process could impact the tax landscape globally – one to watch in 2020.

## Pillar One: proposal to re-allocate taxing rights on non-routine profits

- The OECD has proposed further corporate tax reform a BEPS 2.0.
- BEPS 2.0 looks at two pillars. The first pillar focuses on proposals that would re-allocate taxing rights between jurisdictions where assets are held and the markets where user/consumers are based. Non-routine profits could - to some degree be taxed where customers reside.
- Under such a proposal, a proportion of profits would be re- allocated from small countries to large countries. Such a proposal will reduce Ireland's corporation tax base but it is impossible to predict the size of the impact.
- Nothing has been decided but proposals are currently in the public consultation phase.


#### Pillar Two: proposal for minimum global tax

- Pillar Two the basic idea is to introduce a minimum tax rate with the aim of reducing incentives to shift profits.
- Where income is not taxed to the minimum level, there would an "income inclusion rule" which operates as a 'top-up' to achieve the minimum rate of tax.
- The obvious questions arise:
  - what is the appropriate minimum tax rate?
  - who will get the 'top-up' payment?
  - Is the minimum rate taxed at a global (firm) level or on a country-by-country basis?
- These questions are as yet unanswered. If the minimum rate agreed is greater than the 12.5% rate that Ireland levies, it would erode this country's comparative advantage.




#### House prices have plateaued over the last year

## House prices have stabilised 20% below their peak (100 in 2007)




# Office prices have diverged from retail and industrial (peak = 100)




# Housing supply still below demand; but price inflation has moderated as supply is catching up

## Housing Completions above 22,000 in 2018 but still low historically (000s)



## New dwellings\* make up 80% of housing completions: some debate about the rest



Source: **DoHPCLG**, CSO, NTMA Calculations




\* Housing completions derived from electrical grid connection data for a property. Reconnections of old houses or connections from "ghost estates" overstate the annual run rate of new building.

# Demand has picked up since 2015; credit slowly increasing as cash buyers become less important

## Mortgage drawdowns rise from deep trough (000s)



## Non-mortgage transactions still important but closer to 40% of total




Source: BPFI; Residential Property Price Register




# Residential property prices have steadied in recent quarters; rents continue to increase


## Residential property prices have rebounded strongly since 2012 but steadied in 18/19



## Rents are well above previous peak – out of line with prices



# Irish house price valuation metrics continue to rise but remain below 2008 levels; most countries are expensive



#### Deviation from average price-to-rent ratio (Q1 2019, red dot represent Q1 2008)






Gníomhaireacht Bainistíochta an Chisteáin Náisiúnta National Treasury Management Agency




# Ireland has legacy banking-related assets – equity in banks and expected NAMA surplus

- Banks continue to be profitable: income, cost and balance sheet metrics are much improved.
- Interest rates on mortgages and to SMEs are still high compared to EU thanks to legacy issues and the slow judicial process in accessing collateral.
- An IPO of AIB stock (28.8%) occurred in June 2017. This returned c. €3.4bn to the Irish Exchequer to be used for debt reduction. Further disposal of banking assets will depend on market conditions.

#### All three pillar banks are profitable








#### Domestic bank cost base reduced over time


#### Cost income ratios improve dramatically...



# and IE banks\* below EU average 90% 80% 70% 60% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% LV SK ES PL DK GR PT NL HU SI GB FI IS IE IT EU AT LU BE FR CY DE

#### Staffing (000s) halved post crisis







Source: Annual reports of Irish domestic banks, EBA


<sup>\*</sup> EBA data includes three domestic banks as well as Ulster Bank, DEPFA & Citibank.

# Capital ratios strengthened as banks were slimmed down and consolidated

#### **CET 1 capital ratios (Jun 2019)**

#### 25% 20% 15% 20.3% 10% 17.3% 16.8% 14.4% 5% 0% CET1 % (Transitional) CET1 % (Fully Loaded) ■ AIB ■ BOI ■ PTSB

# Loan-to-deposit ratios have fallen significantly as loan books were slashed



Source: Published bank accounts

Source: Published bank accounts



# Pillar banks sold non-performing loans during 2018, as asset quality continues to improve

All 3 Pillar banks (€bn)	Dec-17	Dec-18
Total Loans	162.4	158.2
Non-performing Exposures	22.0	12.7
(NPE as % of Total)	13.5%	8.0%
Provisions	7.3	4.4
(Provisions as % of book)	4.4%	2.8%
(Provisions as % of Impaired)	33.2%	34.6%


#### Non-performing exposures % of total loans<sup>1</sup> (loss provision % of NPE) Dec-17 Dec-18 Book (€bn) BOI Irish Residential Mortgages 9.5(21) 23.7 11.0(24) 21.7 **UK Residential Mortgages** 1.9(14) 2.3(15) Irish SMEs 11.2(49) 7.6 15.4(46) **UK SMFs** 1.6 8.6(42) 6.1(53) Corporate 3.0(69) 2.6(60) 10.3 CRE - Investment 10.7(44) 7.7 17.9(43) CRE - Land/Development 39.4(55) 14.0(54) 0.6 Consumer Loans 2.1(140) 2.1(98) 5.1 8.3(36) 6.3(35) 78.4

#### AIB Residential Mortgages 14 10.1 (20) 32.3 SMEs/Corporate 5.2 (36) 19.6 11 CRF 7.9 33 18.0 (29) Consumer Loans 18 11.1 (50) 3.1 16 9.6 62.9 **PTSB** Residential Mortgages 21.7(44) 8.8(39) 12.4 Buy-to-let Mortgages 21.8(64) 12.9(113) 4.0 33.3(76) Commercial 30.3(104) 0.2 15.4(92) 7.5(112)0.3 Consumer Loans

21.7(50)

10.0(64)

#### Loan Asset Mix (3 banks Dec 18)






<sup>1</sup> Non-performing exposures include impaired loans, loans past due greater than 90 days but not impaired, and Forborne Collateral Realisations

16.9

# Irish residential mortgage arrears are still improving; but there are legal bottlenecks to normalisation



• Non-bank entities now hold 13 per cent of all PDH mortgage accounts outstanding; 11 per cent are held by regulated retail credit firms, with the remaining 2 per cent held by unregulated loan owners. Credit Servicing Firms hold 22 per cent of all PDH mortgages in arrears over 720 days



<sup>\*</sup> Over 40% of those cases in arrears > 720 days are also in arrears greater than five years.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Four quarter sum of repossessions. Includes voluntary/abandoned dwellings as well as court ordered repossessions

# NAMA has repaid its senior debt of over €30bn; likely to deliver surplus of around €4bn – half of which in 2020

- NAMA's operating performance is strong
  - Acquired 12,000 loans (over 60,000 saleable property units) related to €74bn par of loans of 780 debtors for €32bn
  - NAMA continues to generate net profit after impairment charges.
- It has repaid 100% of €30.2bn of original senior debt
  - NAMA exceeded its senior debt redemption targets well ahead of schedule. It remains on course, subject to market conditions, to redeem its small amount of subordinated debt by 2020.
- NAMA could deliver a surplus for Irish taxpayers of about €4bn, according to its management team if current market conditions remain favourable.
  - The surplus is already factored into the budgetary arithmetic. NAMA plans to return €2bn of the €4bn to the Exchequer in 2020.
- NAMA initiative to develop up to 20,000 housing units by 2020 <u>subject to commercial viability.</u>
  - ▶ Progress has been strong so far: 11,700 units were completed in 2014 2019;
  - Another 1,900 are under construction or have had funding approved;
  - ▶ A further 4,500 have planning permission granted.



# The European Commission's ruling on Apple's tax affairs does not change the NTMA's funding plans

- The EC has ruled that Ireland illegally provided State aid of up to €13bn, plus interest to Apple. This figure is based on the tax foregone as a result of a historic provision in Ireland's tax code. This was closed on December 31st 2014.
- This case has nothing to do with Ireland's corporate tax rate. In its press release the EC stated: "This decision does not call into question Ireland's general tax system or its corporate tax rate".
- Apple is appealing the ruling, as is the Irish Government. This process could be lengthy. Pending the outcome of the appeal, Apple has paid approximately €13bn plus EU interest (c. €2bn) into an escrow fund.
- Bank of New York Mellon has been selected for the provision of escrow agency and custodian services to hold and administer the fund.
- Amundi, BlackRock Investment Management (UK) Limited and Goldman Sachs Asset Management International have been selected for the provision of investment management services for the fund.
- As the funds will be held in escrow pending the outcome of the appeal, the NTMA has made no allowance for these funds.

# Government's NDP outlines green projects; aim to cut CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by at least 80% by 2050

1 in 5 euros in the National Development Plan (NDP) to be spent on green projects

Sustainable Mobility €8.6 billion

Sustainable
Management
of Water and
Environmental
Resources
€6.8 billion


Transition to a
Low carbon
and Climate
Resilient
Society
€7.6 billion

Total:€23 billion (13% of GNI\*)











# Distortions to GDP/GNP make them sub-optimal indicators of economic performance

## Substantial activity from multinationals distorts the national accounts



## Reclassification of several companies and "onshoring" of IP led to step change in GDP




# The change in capital stock resulted in large increase in net exports – mostly through contract manufacturing (CM)

The capital stock expanded in 2015 by c. €300bn or c. 40%. This is due to:

- Re-domiciling/inversions of several multinational companies
- The "onshoring" of IP assets into Ireland by multinationals
- The movement of aircraft leasing assets in Ireland.

Goods produced by the additional capital were mainly exported. Complicating matters, the goods were produced through "contract manufacturing".

CM occurs where a company in Ireland engages another abroad to manufacture products on its behalf.



Crucially, the foreign contract manufacturer supplies a manufacturing service to the Irish entity but the overseas contractor never takes ownership of the product. When the product is sold abroad, a change of economic ownership takes place between Ireland and the country where the product is sold. This export is recorded in Ireland's statistics even though it was never produced in Ireland.


Little or no employment in Ireland results from this contract manufacturing.



# Investment distorted by multinationals importing intellectual property (IP) into Ireland

- Investment is above the pre-crisis level due to MNCs importing intangibles into Ireland.
- Ireland has become an ICT hub in recent years with this investment impacting the real economy.
- However the recent sharp increase in intangibles investment overstates Ireland's position and should be discounted accordingly.

#### **Investment (4Q sum, €bns)**





# GNI\* is a better measure of underlying economic activity than GDP/GNP; best as a level rather than a growth metric


- GDP headline numbers do not reflect the "true" growth of Ireland's income due to MNCs.
- Reasons for 2015-18 MNC distortions:
  - Re-domiciling/inversions of several multinational companies
  - The "onshoring" of IP assets into Ireland by multinationals
  - The movement of aircraft leasing assets in Ireland.
- By modifying GNI to take account of these factors, GNI\* gives us a better understanding of the underlying economy.

National Account –	2015	2016	2017	2018
Current Prices				
(€, y-o-y growth rates)				
<b>Gross Domestic Product</b>	262.8bn	271.7bn	297.1bn	324.0bn
(GDP)	(34.9%)	(3.4%)	(9.4%)	(9.4%)
minus Net Factor Income				
from rest of the world				
= Gross National Product	200.8bn	220.6bn	234.9bn	253.1bn
(GNP)	(22.9%)	(9.9%)	(6.5%)	(7.7%)
add EU subsidies minus	1.2bn	1.0bn	1.1bn	1.1bn
EU taxes				
= Gross National Income	202.0bn	221.6bn	236.0bn	254.2bn
(GNI)	(22.9%)	(9.7%)	(6.5%)	(7.7%)
minus retained earnings	-4.7bn	-5.8bn	-4.5bn	-5.0bn
of re-domiciled firms				
minus depreciation on	-30.1bn	-35.3bn	-42.5bn	-46.3bn
foreign owned IP assets				
minus depreciation on	-4.6bn	-4.9bn	-5.1bn	-5.4bn
aircraft leasing				
= GNI*	162.7bn	175.6bn	184.0bn	197.5bn
	(9.4%)	(8.0%)	(4.7%)	(7.3%)



# Modified Domestic Demand (MDD) – which ignores exports - is best cyclical indicator

- GNI\* is useful but not timely. MDD and MFDD are released on a quarterly and real basis.
- MDD ignores the net exports channel. It also omits aircraft leasing and IP imports from investment.
- The measure includes:
  - Private and government consumption
  - Building investment
  - Some machinery & equipment investment
  - Some intangible asset investment
  - Value of physical changes in stock. This last piece is impacted by MNCs and is quite volatile.
- MDD has Ireland growing negatively in Q1 2019 mainly due to volatility in stocks.
- When stocks are excluded, (i.e. using Modified Final Domestic Demand) <u>real underlying growth was 2.6%</u> in Q3 2019. Since 2014, annual growth has averaged 4.3% when looking at MFDD.





#### **Disclaimer**

The information in this presentation is issued by the National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA) for informational purposes. The contents of the presentation do not constitute investment advice and should not be read as such. The presentation does not constitute and is not an invitation or offer to buy or sell securities.

The NTMA makes no warranty, express or implied, nor assumes any liability or responsibility for the accuracy, correctness, completeness, availability, fitness for purpose or use of any information that is available in this presentation nor represents that its use would not infringe other proprietary rights. The information contained in this presentation speaks only as of the particular date or dates included in the accompanying slides. The NTMA undertakes no obligation to, and disclaims any duty to, update any of the information provided. Nothing contained in this presentation is, or may be relied on as a promise or representation (past or future) of the Irish State or the NTMA.

The contents of this presentation should not be construed as legal, business or tax advice.