

2018 saw first budget surplus since 2007

January 2019



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
Page 68: Other Data


Page 80: Annex (GDP distortions explainer)



# Domestic economy growing: averaging five per cent in 2014-18








# Primary surplus, improving debt dynamics and cash balances provide protection

### Five years of primary surplus (€bn)



### Ireland is improving its debt dynamics by the month


Debt-to-GNI\* (105% 2018f, from 166%)

Debt-to-GG Revenue (255% 2018f, from 353%)

Average interest rate (2.6% 2018f, from 5.1%)

Debt-to-GDP^ (64% 2018f, from 120%)

### NTMA bond prefunding provides protection (€bn)



- ☑ Debt Prefunded with Bonds
- Debt Profile



#### Main risks are external and outside Ireland's control

## Late Cycle

Ireland is later than the Euro Area (EA) in its economic cycle thanks to its close ties to US

China slowdown, trade wars, tightening monetary policy all point to headwind for Ireland

## US

on the US economy, in particular its ICT sector

Impact of US Corporate Tax reform

## **Brexit**

"Hard" Brexit could impact Irish growth by 4%-7% over a 4-5 year period

Over a two-year period the economic hit could be 3%+

#### Funding range in 2019 of €14-18bn: similar to 2018

#### Green

€3bn raised through the syndicated sale of Ireland's first Sovereign Green bond.

Yield of 1.399% on 2031 bond

## €14-18bn


2019 funding range €4bn 10yr issued in '19

<u>2018</u>

€17.25bn funding completed Average maturity 11.8 years Interest rate of 1.07%


#### €15bn Cash

€15.3bn year end 2018 cash balance. Ireland prefunded heading into more volatile times




# Labour market best illustrates Ireland's growth story – 100K non-construction jobs added on net vs. 2008 peak

#### Unemployment rate: 5.3% in December 2018




### Total employment back above previous peak as 100K non-construction jobs added on net




# High skill job creation and full-time employment expanding strongly before easing in recent quarters

#### High skill employment growth has been strong in recent years




#### Substantial full-time employment growth






# Labour participation has not yet fully recovered – young reaching labour force later

#### Participation rate hovering around 62%




### Part. rate down as construction jobs lost and younger people stay in education longer




#### Wages growth evident in 2018 but uneven across sectors

### Wage growth a driver for increase in compensation of employees...



## ... however disparities remain across sectors regarding wage growth



◆ 2018 Q3 average annual earnings (€000, RHS)




# Ireland's labour market is edging closer to full employment - US and UK likely already there

## Unemployment rates falling across Europe; falling faster here

	2012	2016	2017	18Q3
Germany	5.4	4.2	3.8	3.4
Netherlands	5.8	6.0	4.9	3.8
Austria	4.9	6.0	5.5	4.9
Luxembourg	5.1	6.3	5.6	5.1
Slovenia	8.9	8.0	6.6	5.3
<u>Ireland</u>	<u>15.5</u>	<u>8.4</u>	<u>6.7</u>	<u>5.6</u>
Belgium	7.6	7.9	7.1	6.5
Sweden	8.0	6.9	6.7	6.5
EU 28	10.5	8.6	7.6	6.7
Portugal	15.8	11.2	9.0	6.8
Euro Area	11.4	10.0	9.1	8.1
France	9.8	10.1	9.4	9.3
Italy	10.7	11.7	11.3	10.0
Spain	24.8	19.6	17.2	15.0

## Ireland's unemployment (% of labour force) converging on main trading partners






#### **External environment less helpful for Ireland**

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019f
EA Monetary Policy	Accommodative	Accommodative	Accommodative	Less accommodative	Much less accommodative
US Monetary Policy	Accommodative	Accommodative	Accommodative but tightening	Further tightening	Further tightening: curve inversion?
US growth	Stimulative	Less stimulative	Stimulative	Stimulative due to fiscal package	Trade/Mon. Policy lead to slowdown?
Oil price	Falling	Falling	Rising	Falling	Neutral
UK growth	Stimulative	Less favourable; Brexit impact	Growth slowing	Growth slowing	Brexit crunch
Euro currency	Very Helpful	Helpful	Headwind	Neutral	Neutral



#### GDP distortions mean we need to look to other metrics; Irish recovery evident when looking at GNI\*

### GNI\* was €181bn in 2017; 9.4% higher than in 2007 (current prices)




### GNI\* growth rate averaged 7.5% 2013-2017 (current prices)




#### Short-term indicators robust if a little less hot

#### MDD grew strongly in 2018




## Ireland's PMIs are expanding but down from heights of 2016






#### Recovery has not been driven by credit so far

### Lending for house purchase only edging into positive territory recently



## Building investment % of domestic demand is growing – led by non-residential







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#### **Export growth has slowed in recent quarters**

#### **Exports outside MNC-dominated sectors** have slowed




### Ireland's exports are dominated by pharma and technology (2018 data)






# Consumer spending growth fuelled by rising incomes rather than recourse to debt

### Private consumption grew at 3.0% y-o-y in Q3 2018




## Services consumption driving recent consumption growth




#### Private debt levels are high but improving

### Household debt ratio has decreased due to deleveraging and increasing incomes



### Debt to after-tax income\* improving (128%) but among highest in Europe



■ Household Debt (% of Disposable income)


Source: <u>Eurostat</u> (Q2 2018)






# Saving rate lower in recent years, facilitating consumption and slower pace of deleveraging

### Gross household saving rate lower than peak but healthy 8-11%




### Interest burden down to only 4% of disposable income from peak of 11%





# Despite being late cycle, inflation is low; Ireland's *Phillips*Curve may be "kinked"


### Inflation (%) in Ireland lower than EA due mostly to sterling weakness post-Brexit vote




Source: <u>CSO</u>, Eurostat

#### Gníomhaireacht Bainistíochta an Chisteáin Náisiúnta National Treasury Management Agency

## Wage growth a natural consequence of improving labour conditions (1999-2021)




Source: CSO, NTMA analysis \*red dots are Budget 2019 forecasts (2018-2020); Non-Agriculture employment /wage data




# Ireland provisionally recorded a full budget surplus for first time in 11 years in 2018

### Gen. Govt. Balance from -12% to surplus (ex-banking recap) in 7 yrs



### Revenue surge has helped Ireland balance the books since 2015 (€bn)



# Ireland has improved its debt dynamics: next step is to follow others and run consistent GGB surplus

#### In recent years Ireland has run primary surpluses that reduced debt ratios


#### 15% 10% 5% 0% -5% -10% -15% -20% -25% -40% Primary Balance (% of GNI\*) Debt Stabilising PB (% of GNI\*)


### 2018 GGB Deficit/Surplus (% of GDP); Ireland middle of the pack in Europe






# Gross Government debt forecasted to be 64% of GDP at end-2018; 105% of GNI\*; reality somewhere in between







# Alternative debt service metrics must also be used for Ireland e.g. General Government debt to GG Revenue





#### It's best to analyse Irish debt with broad range of metrics

2017	GG debt to GG revenue %	GG interest to GG rev %	GG debt to GDP %
Greece	365.8%	6.5%	178.6%
Portugal	292.9%	9.0%	125.7%
Italy	282.9%	8.2%	131.8%
Ireland	263.0% (255%*)	7.6%** (6.5%*)	68.0%*** (64%*)
Spain	259.4%	6.8%	98.3%
Cyprus	244.1%	8.0%	97.5%
UK	220.8%	6.9%	87.7%
Belgium	201.5%	4.8%	103.1%
EA19	187.7%	4.3%	86.7%
EU28	181.8%	4.4%	81.6%
France	180.0%	3.3%	97.0%
Slovenia	170.8%	5.8%	73.6%
Austria	162.1%	3.8%	78.4%
Germany	142.0%	2.3%	64.1%
Slovakia	129.2%	3.5%	50.9%


Source: Eurostat, Department of Finance

<sup>\*</sup>IE figures in brackets are 2018 forecast from the Department of Finance

<sup>\*\* 2017</sup> Interest % of GG Revenue would be closer to 6.0-6.5% if you exclude the interest paid to CBI. Other countries would also see their interest % of GG Revenue fall under this treatment.

<sup>\*\*\* 111%</sup> Debt to GNI\* ratio in 2017. likely close to 105% at end-2018.


# Snowball Effect (i-g) in Ireland's favour given lower average interest rate






# Corporation tax revenue keeps surprising positively, but each year the concentration risk increases


#### Corporation tax receipts have more than doubled in four years



#### Income tax base intact (% tax revenue) - not comparable to narrowing of base pre-crisis



#### Over 50% of Irish debt stock held by "sticky" sources






<sup>\*</sup>excludes those held by Eurosystem. Euro system holdings include SMP, PSPP and CBI holdings of FRNs. Figures do not include ANFA holdings which are likely to further increase the Eurosystem's holdings.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Includes IMF, EFSF, EFSM, Bilateral as well as IBRC-related liabilities.

Retail includes State Savings and other currency and deposits. The CSO series has been altered to exclude the impact of IBRC on the data.

#### Maturity profile – IMF repayment and FRN buy-backs reduced refinancing risk; Green diversifies investor base






Source: NTMA

Note: EFSM loans are subject to a 7-year extension that will bring their weighted-average maturity from 12.5 years to 19.5 years. It is not expected that Ireland will refinance any of its EFSM loans before 2027. As such we have placed the pre-2027 EFSM loan maturity dates in the 2027-30 range although these may be subject to change.

#### The NTMA took advantage of QE to extend debt profile

### Various operations have extended the maturity of Government debt ...



Source: NTMA: ECB

### ...Ireland (in years) now compares favourably to other EU countries







\*excludes programme loans. Ireland's maturity including these loans is still similar

#### Funding strategy has lowered the State's interest burden

NTMA issued €59bn MLT debt since 2015; 13.3 yr. weighted maturity; avg. rate of 1.1%




Interest costs were expected to reach almost €10bn but now are below €5.5bn a year





#### The State is funded three to four quarters in advance

- The next redemption is in June (€7.1bn).
- In January 2019, the NTMA issued a 10 year benchmark bond. It raised €4bn at 1.123% yield.
- In 2018, the NTMA issued three new bonds by syndication.
  - A 10 year benchmark bond raised
     €4bn at a yield of 0.944%.
  - A 15 year benchmark bond raised
     €4bn at a yield of 1.319%.
  - In October, Ireland issued its first Sovereign Green Bond. It raised €3bn for12y money at 1.399%.
- Fnd-2018 cash balance was €15.3bn.




#### Source: NTMA

- EBR is the Exchequer Borrowing Requirement (DOF estimate)
- Outflows, long term paper and end-year cash position are estimates for illustrative purposes.
- Cash balances excludes non-liquid asset classes such as Housing Finance Agency (HFA) Guaranteed Notes.
- Other outflows includes bilateral loans, bond buybacks, switches, and contingencies.
- Other funding includes Retail (State Savings).
- Rounding may occur.



# Late cycle risks mixed for Ireland: rates may remain low but end of ECB bond buying may expose credit spread

If US yield curve inverts, recession is likely to follow – keeping base rates at zero\*




### In euro area, PSPP is ending as tightening cycle starts very slowly






### Investor base for Government bonds is wide and varied

## Investor breakdown: Average over last 5 syndications



## Country breakdown: Average over last 5 syndications



### Ireland issued 2031 Sovereign Green Bond in Oct. 2018

## €3bn

Final order book of €11.3bn 95% to non-Irish investors UK 23%; Germany/Austria and France 19% each; Nordics 12%; Benelux 11% 1.399%

2031 maturity priced at MS+12 bps

# New demand

Increased demand from the three established centres for green investment
France 19%, the Netherlands
9% and Nordics 12%

- Green Bond Framework aligned with the ICMA Green Bond Principles (see slide 77)
- 1 in 5 euros in the National Development Plan to be spent on green projects (see slide 78)



### **Breakdown of Ireland's General Government debt**

Source: CSO

€ Billion	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018 Q2
Currency and deposits (mainly retail debt)	31.4	20.9	20.7	21.3	21.6	21.6
Securities other than shares, exc. financial derivatives	112.7	119.1	125.8	124.2	130.7	143.2
- Short-term (T-Bills, CP etc)	2.4	3.8	1.4	2.4	2.9	6.7
- Long-term (MLT bonds)	110.3	115.3	124.4	121.8	127.8	136.5
Loans	71.3	63.4	55.1	55.2	49.0	50.2
- Short-term	1.4	1.3	1.0	0.7	0.5	1.3
- Long-term (official funding and prom notes 2009-12)	69.9	62.1	54.1	54.6	48.5	48.9
General Government Debt	215.3	203.4	201.6	200.7	201.3	214.9
EDP debt instrument assets	53.9	36.1	29.0	24.9	27.3	38.2
Net Government debt	161.4	167.3	172.6	175.8	174.0	176.8



# Central Bank of Ireland holdings increase domestic share of Irish Government bonds (IGBs) through PSPP


€ Billion					
End quarter	Dec 2014	Dec 2015	Dec 2016	Dec 2017	Q3 18
1. Resident	50.8	50.8	56.1	56.1	58.4
(as % of total)	(43.7%)	(40.6%)	(46.1%)	(44.2%)	(42.5%)
– Credit Institutions and Central Bank*	45.9	46.9	51.1	51.7	54.0
– General Government	1.6	0.8	0.5	0.4	0.4
– Non-bank financial	2.9	2.8	4.3	3.8	3.9
– Households (and NFCs)	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.1
2. Rest of world	65.5	74.2	65.5	70.9	79.0
(as % of total)	(56.3%)	(59.4%)	(53.9%)	(55.8%)	(57.5%)
Total MLT debt	116.3	125.1	121.6	127.0	137.4




### Ireland: "A" grade from all major credit rating agencies

Rating Agency	Long-term	Short-term	Outlook/Trend	Date of last change
Standard & Poor's	A+	A-1	Stable	June 2015
Fitch Ratings	A+	F1+	Stable	Dec 2017
Moody's	A2	P-1	Stable	Sept 2017
DBRS	A(high)	R-1 (middle)	Stable	March 2016
R&I	А	a-1	Stable	Jan. 2017





### Brexit's muddied path - Government deal unlikely to pass (first time) leaving Hard Brexit a distinct possibility



## Whether "hard" or "soft" Brexit materialises, trade is likely to be negatively impacted

2017	Go	Goods		Services		Total	
	Ехр.	lmp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	lmp.	
US	27.1	20.5	11.6	27.0	18.3	25.0	
<u>UK*</u>	<u>13.4</u>	23.6	<u>16.4</u>	9.3	<u>15.1</u>	13.7	
NI	1.6	1.6	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	
EU-27	36.5	31.3	29.9	25.7	32.8	27.4	
China	4.1	5.7	2.5	1.5	3.2	2.8	
Other	18.8	18.9	39.5	36.6	30.5	31.1	

#### Irish/UK trade linkages will suffer following Brexit

- The UK is the second largest single-country export destination for Ireland's goods and the largest for its services
- At the same time, Ireland imports 20-25% of its goods from the UK. Consumer goods, capital equipment and inputs into the export process will become cheaper thanks to FX.

### There is significant employment related to Ireland's trade with the UK


 The UK might only account for 15% of Ireland's total exports, but Ireland is more dependent than that, when you consider the employment related to those exports

SMEs account for over 55% of IE exports to UK. They are likely to be more affected than larger companies by the introduction of tariffs and barriers to trade




# Breakdown of exports to the UK: important trade partner especially so in smaller sectors (agri-food products)

## UK is 13-14% of goods exports but very important partner in many small sectors



## UK is 16% of services exports but not the majority trading partner in any segment



### Hard Brexit impact estimates all show similar story return to WTO rules would be a strong negative for Ireland

Forecast vs. no Brexit baseline	Short term (2 years)	Medium term (5 years)	Long term (10-15 years)
Department of Finance (ESRI)	-2.0%	-3.3%	-4.0%
Copenhagen Economics	-2.0 to 2.5%	-4.5%	-7.0% (of which -4.9% is due to regulatory divergence)
Bank of England "disruptive" (implied)	-5.0%	-6.2%	-6.2%
Bank of England "disorderly" (implied)	-6.3%	-8.2%	-8.2%
UK Treasury range (implied)	-	-	-5.0 to 7.2%



# Some foreign banks have already announced that they will set up in Dublin after Brexit

#### FDI: Ireland may benefit

- Ireland could be a beneficiary from displaced FDI.
   The chief areas of interest are
  - Financial services
  - Business services
  - IT/ new media.
- Dublin is primarily competing with Frankfurt,
   Paris, Luxembourg and Amsterdam for financial services.
- Ireland's FDI opportunity will depend on the outcome of post-exit trade negotiations. The UK (City of London) is almost certain to lose its EU passporting rights on exit, so there may be more opportunities in time.

### Companies that have indicated jobs to be moved to Ireland

J.P.Morgan























## Much rebalancing has taken place – Ireland's structural growth drivers have reasserted

## Gross National Income\* at current prices (1995=100)




## Ireland's GNI\* per capita hit 2007 levels and compares favourably to EA




### Ireland's population profile healthier than the EU average

### Ireland's population jumped to 4.79m in 2017 – up 200,000 on the 2011 Census




## Ireland's population will remain younger than most of its EA counterparts




# Favourable population characteristics underpin debt sustainability over longer term: next 10 years look great

## Regional data show Ireland's mix of young and old among the best in EU



Source: Eurostat; Regional NUTS2 basis Note: Each dot is a NUTS2 region in the EU. Y-axis is inverted Ireland's Working-Age Population expected to grow in coming years (2018-2028)




Source: Oxford Economics forecasts




### Openness to immigration has been beneficial to Ireland

## Latest Census data show net migration positive since 2015 – mirroring economy




### Highly educated migrants moving to Ireland "Reverse Brain Drain"



# Openness to trade is also central to Irish success – led by services exports; Brexit may hinder export-led growth

### Cumulative post-crisis total exports (4Q sum to end-2008 = 100, current prices)



## Ireland benefits from export diversification by destination

2017	Goods		Services		Total	
	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	Imp.	Exp.	lmp.
US	27.1	20.5	11.6	27.0	18.3	25.0
<u>UK*</u>	13.4	23.6	<u>16.4</u>	9.3	<u>15.1</u>	13.7
NI	1.6	1.6	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
EU-27	36.5	31.3	29.9	25.7	32.8	27.4
China	4.1	5.7	2.5	1.5	3.2	2.8
Other	18.8	18.9	39.5	36.6	30.5	31.1




## Ireland's goods exports respond vigorously to euro movements – in both directions

- A 1% depreciation of the euro increases Irish goods exports to the US by 1%
- The equivalent response for exports to the UK is 1.1% and to the rest of world is 0.8%. Brexit has the opposite effect on Irish exports.
- The EUR/USD exchange rate has a positive effect (elasticity of 0.4) on Irish goods exports to the euro area, due to Ireland-based multinational companies' exports to EA for onward sale to the rest of the world
- The elasticity of total goods exports excluding pharma to the exchange rate >1

Source: CSO; NTMA empirical analysis

Note: All coefficients significant at 99% level; not affected by contract manufacturing. Time period is 1998 to 2016 Q2. For longer time periods, the UK elasticity is smaller (closer to 0.4-0.5 for 1981 onwards).

## Response (% chg.) of Irish goods exports to 1% depreciation of the euro







# Crucially, openness to overseas capital has played a big part in Ireland's economic development

#### Average FDI inflow in \$ per capita, 2012–17

#### Ireland has attracted high-quality jobs





■ % of employment in High Tech Sectors (5Y Average)



Source: Unctad (UN) database, Eurostat

## All this leads to mixture of highly productive and labour intensive sectors in Ireland





## Ireland is pretty competitive now; we need to avoid repeat of the mid-2000s


#### Nominal Labour Cost Ratio - IE vs Euro Area



Source: Eurostat, NTMA analysis \*Ratio = IE Nom. Labour

Costs/ EA Nom. Labour Costs

## Unemployment back towards 1999-2007 level, but wage growth less than half



Source: CSO, Eurostat, NTMA calculations


# Ireland's strong fundamentals highlighted by performance on United Nations sustainability index

Selected Countries	Global Rank	Index Score (0-100)
Sweden	1	85.6
Denmark	2	84.2
Finland	3	84.0
Norway	4	83.9
Czech Republic	5	81.9
Germany	6	81.7
France	10	80.3
Belgium	12	80.0
United Kingdom	16	78.3
<u>Ireland</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>77.9</u>
Spain	25	76.8
Portugal	28	75.6
Italy	30	75.5
Luxembourg	33	75.0
Greece	38	72.9
United States	42	72.4

Ireland	Global rank	Vs. Regional Average
Subjective Wellbeing (2016)	13/133	1
Environmental Performance Index (2016)	19/155	1
Human Development Index (2016)	8/157	1
Global Competitiveness Index (2016/17)	21/134	1
Global Peace Index (2016)	12/149	1


# Ireland's performs well versus peers in particular on governance metrics

### Ireland is close to OECD norms on social issues




## Ireland scores well on metrics such as property rights and government efficiency

UN Goal – Peace, Justice and Strong institutions	Ireland Actual Figure	Ireland Normalised (world leader = 100)	OECD Average
Overall	-	87.5	75.8
Corruption Perception Index (0-100)	73.0	79.4	73.5
Government Efficiency (1-7)	4.8	<u>74.8</u>	<u>52.8</u>
Homicides (per 100,000 people)	1.1	97.8	96.1
Prison population (per 100,000 people)	80.0	87.8	74.6
Property Rights (1-7)	6.1	94.8	<u>73.1</u>
Population who feel safe walking alone at night (%)	75.0	73.7	67.4




## Residential property prices have rebounded strongly since 2012; Commercial cooled in 2018

## House prices rising strongly but some way off peak (Y-o-Y change, RHS peak =100)




## Office leads commercial property (peak = 100)




# Housing supply still below demand; price inflation has cooled as supply slowly catching up

## Housing Completions above 19,000 in 2017 but still low historically (000s)



## New dwellings\* make up 75% of housing completions: some debate abut the rest



Source: DoHPCLG, CSO, NTMA Calculations




\* Housing completions derived from electrical grid connection data for a property. Reconnections of old houses or connections from "ghost estates" overstate the annual run rate of new building.

# Demand has picked up since 2015; Credit slowly increasing as cash buyers become less important

## Mortgage drawdowns rise from deep trough (000s)




## Non-mortgage transactions still important but falling below 40% of total



Source: BPFI; Residential Property Price Register



## Residential property prices have rebounded strongly since 2012 but cooled off in 2018






# CBI's macro-prudential rules increase resilience of banking and household sector


#### **CBI's amended macro-prudential rules**

- First time buyers (FTBs) can borrow 90% of the value of a home (10% minimum deposit). Five per cent of the total new lending to FTBs will be allowed above the 90% LTV limit.
- For second and subsequent buyers (SSBs), banks must restrict lending for primary dwelling purchase above 80 per cent LTV to no more than 20 per cent of new lending to SSBs.
- Bank must restrict lending for primary dwelling purchase above 3.5 times LTI to no more than 20 per cent of that aggregate value for FTBs and 10 per cent for SSBs.
- Banks have to limit Buy-to-Let loans (BTL) above
   70 per cent LTV to 10 per cent of all BTL loans.

#### Transaction growth has slowed since macroprudential rules introduced



### Irish house price valuations continue to rise but remain below 2008 levels




#### Deviation from average price-to-rent ratio (Q2 2018, red dot represent Q1 2008)





Source: OECD, NTMA Workings

# Real commercial property prices still down from peak (index 1983 = 100)





Source: IPD; NTMA
Note: IPD office price index updated to Q3 2017



### Ireland has legacy banking-related assets

#### Banking

- Banks are now profitable; income, cost and balance sheet metrics are much improved.
- Interest rates on mortgages and to SMEs are still high compared to EU thanks to legacy issues and the slow judicial process in accessing collateral.
- An IPO of AIB stock (28.8%) was completed in June 2017. This returned c. €3.4bn to the Irish Exchequer.


#### NAMA

- NAMA has repaid 100% of its senior debt; it forecasts a profit of €3.5bn subject to market conditions.
- This is expected to be returned to the Government coffers in the next few years.

#### IBRC

- Liquidation of the IBRC will ultimately return over €1.1bn to the Irish Exchequer.
- To date, the Exchequer received €870m in 2016-18 and is expected to receive a further c.€200m in the coming months.


### All three pillar banks profitable given enhanced margins



Profit measures are before exceptional items, 2018H1 figure annualised

### Domestic bank cost base reduced over time

#### Cost income ratios improve dramatically...



#### 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30%

... and IE banks\* below to EU average

### Staffing (000s) shrunk by c.50% post crisis

IV SK FS PL DK GR PT NI HU SI GB FI IS IF IT FU AT IU BF FR CY DF



Source: Annual reports of Irish domestic banks

Gníomhaireacht Bainistíochta an Chisteáin Náisiúnta




20%


10%

## Capital ratios strengthened as banks were slimmed down and consolidated

#### **CET 1 capital ratios (Jun-18)**



## Loan-to-deposit ratios have fallen significantly as loan books slimmed down



Source: Published bank accounts

Source: Published bank accounts




Note: "Transitional" refers to the transitional Basel III required for CET1 ratios "Fully loaded" refers to the actual Basel III basis for CET1 ratios.

## Asset quality continues to improve: impaired loans and provisions fall in 2017

All 3 PCAR banks (€bn)	Dec-15	Dec-16	Dec-17
Total Loans	186.5	168.9	160.2
Impaired	29.0	20.3	14.8
(Impaired as % of Total)	15.5%	12.0%	9.2%
Provisions	14.7	9.9	7.6
(Provisions as % of book)	7.9%	5.9%	4.7%
(Provisions as % of Impaired)	50.6%	48.8%	51.4%

#### Loan Asset Mix (3 banks Dec 17)



Impaired loans % (coverage %)¹ by bank and asset					
		Dec-15	Dec-16	Dec-17	Book (€bn)
BOI	Irish Residential Mortgages	9.3(52)	6.0(45)	4.7(42)	24.1
/	UK Residential Mortgages	1.6(22)	0.7(15)	0.8(11)	22.6
	Irish SMEs	21.9(52)	15.7(55)	12.0(56)	8.2
	UK SMEs	11.1(51)	6.3(55)	5.9(52)	1.7
	Corporate	4.6(59)	3.5(54)	2.9(62)	8.8
	CRE - Investment	28.5(53)	21.1(57)	13.7(51)	8.3
	CRE - Land/Development	84.8(76)	68.8(73)	35.3(60)	0.5
	Consumer Loans	4.1(105)	2.7(66)	2.1(63)	4.3
		11.6(56)	7.6(54)	5.2(49)	78.5

AIB	Irish Residential Mortgages	16.6(38)	13.1(44)	9.8(44)	32.2
	UK Residential Mortgages	10.8(50)	10.8(46)	8.4(30)	1.5
	SMEs/Corporate	11.5(63)	8.0(60)	4.9(54)	17.7
	CRE	37.4(61)	29.0(53)	20.4(51)	8.8
	Consumer Loans	19.9(70)	13.9(58)	11.6(56)	3.1
		10 6(47)	140(44)	10.0/53\	63.3
		18.6(47)	14.0(44)	10.0(53)	63.3

		21.1(49)	23.1(51)	24.2(50)	18.4
	Consumer Loans	27.0(93)	22.3(88)	16.6(92)	0.3
	Commercial	35.8(69)	29.6(113)	46.4(104)	0.2
	UK Residential Mortgages	3.9(39)	0.0(0)	0.0(0)	0
PTSB	Irish Residential Mortgages	23.6(49)	23.4(49)	24.2(49)	17.9

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Total impairment provisions are used for coverage ratios (in parentheses)



#### Profitability aided by higher interest rates than EA peers

#### Ireland's interest rates on lending for house purchase the highest in euro area

#### 8 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 2008 2012


2014

2016

2018

Euro Area

#### Rates on SME loans\* over euro area average



<sup>\*</sup>SME loans proxy of loans <1year and <€1m to Non-Financial Corporates




Source: ECB

2010

• • • • Max • • • • Min ——Ireland

## Irish residential mortgage arrears are improving across all duration categories; environment still abnormal



• Non-bank entities now hold 10 per cent of all PDH mortgage accounts outstanding; 8 per cent are held by regulated retail credit firms, with the remaining 2 per cent held by unregulated loan owners. Unregulated loan owners hold 17 per cent of all PDH mortgages in arrears over 720 days



<sup>\*</sup> Over 40% of those cases in arrears > 720 days are also in arrears greater than five years.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Four quarter sum of repossessions. Includes voluntary/abandoned dwellings as well as court ordered repossessions


### NAMA: All original senior debt has been repaid; likely to deliver surplus of around €3.5bn

- NAMA's operating performance is strong
  - Acquired 12,000 loans (over 60,000 saleable property units) related to €74bn par of loans of 780 debtors for €32bn
  - NAMA continues to generate net profit after impairment charges.
- It has repaid 100% of €30.2bn of original senior debt
  - NAMA exceeded its senior debt redemption targets well ahead of schedule. It remains on course, subject to market conditions, to redeem its small amount of subordinated debt by 2020.
- NAMA could deliver a surplus for Irish taxpayers of about €3.5bn, according to its management team if current market conditions remain favourable.
- NAMA initiative to develop up to 20,000 housing units by 2020 subject to commercial viability.
  - ▶ Progress has been strong so far with 9,700 units completed from 2014 2018;
  - Another 3,000 under construction or have had funding approved;
  - ▶ A further 6,400 have planning permission granted.

### The European Commission's ruling on Apple's tax affairs does not change the NTMA's funding plans

- The EC has ruled that Ireland illegally provided State aid of up to €13bn, plus interest to Apple. This figure is based on the tax foregone as a result of a historic provision in Ireland's tax code. This was closed on December 31st 2014.
- This case has nothing to do with Ireland's corporate tax rate. In its press release the EC stated: "This decision does not call into question Ireland's general tax system or its corporate tax rate".
- Apple is appealing the ruling, as is the Irish Government. This process could be lengthy. Pending the outcome of the appeal, Apple has paid approximately €13bn plus EU interest into an escrow fund.
- Bank of New York Mellon has been selected for the provision of escrow agency and custodian services to hold and administer the fund.
- Amundi, BlackRock Investment Management (UK) Limited and Goldman Sachs Asset Management International have been selected for the provision of investment management services for the fund.
- As the funds will be held in escrow pending the outcome of the appeal, the NTMA has made no allowance for these funds.

### Irish Sovereign Green Bond Framework aligned with the ICMA Green Bond Principles



**External Verification** 



# Government's NDP outlines green projects; aim to cut CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by at least 80% by 2050

1 in 5 euros in the NDP to be spent on green projects

Sustainable Mobility €8.6 billion

Sustainable
Management
of Water and
Environmental
Resources
€6.8 billion


Transition to a Low carbon and Climate Resilient Society €7.6 billion

Total:€23 billion (13% of GNI\*)












## Distortions to GDP/GNP make them sub-optimal indicators of economic performance





# Reclassification of several companies and "onshoring" of IP led to step change in GDP & capital stock








# The change in capital stock resulted in large increase in net exports

- The capital stock expanded in 2015
   by c. €300bn or c. 40%. This is due to:
  - Re-domiciling/inversions of several multinational companies
  - The "onshoring" of IP assets into Ireland by multinationals
  - The movement of aircraft leasing assets in Ireland.
- The transfer of whole entities and assets of this size is not something seen before in Ireland.
- Goods produced by the additional capital were mainly exported. Complicating matters, the goods were produced through "contract manufacturing" (explained in detail overleaf).
- Little or no employment in Ireland results from this contract manufacturing.


Source: CSO





#### Contract manufacturing (CM) overstates the extent of goods export growth in the last three years

- Contract manufacturing (CM) occurs where a company in Ireland engages another abroad to manufacture products on its behalf.
- Crucially, the foreign contract manufacturer supplies a manufacturing service to the Irish entity but the overseas contractor never takes ownership of the product. When the product is sold abroad, a change of economic ownership takes place between Ireland and the country where the product is sold.
- This export is recorded in Ireland's statistics even though it was never produced in Ireland.
- Previously, CM did not have a significant net impact on GDP as the company would send royalties back to where the intellectual property (IP) was "owned" – it was a royalty import. Now that the IP is here, Ireland's GDP is artificially inflated.




Source: CSO, NTMA Calculations



## Investment distorted by multinationals importing intellectual property (IP) into Ireland

- Investment is above the pre-crisis level due to MNCs importing intangibles into Ireland.
- Ireland has become an ICT hub in recent years with this investment impacting the real economy.
- However the recent sharp increase in intangibles investment overstates Ireland's position and should be discounted accordingly.
- Building investment grew by 10% y-o-y in Q1-Q3 2018 versus 2017 highlighting pent up demand for housing.

#### **Investment (4Q sum, €bns)**






#### GNI\* is a better measure of underlying economic activity than GDP/GNP

- GDP headline numbers do not reflect the "true" growth of Ireland's income due to MNCs.
- Reasons for 2015-17 MNC distortions:
  - Re-domiciling/inversions of several multinational companies
  - The "onshoring" of IP assets into Ireland by multinationals
  - The movement of aircraft leasing assets in Ireland.
- By modifying GNI to take account of these factors, GNI\* gives us a better understanding of the underlying economy.
- GNI\* only available in nominal terms at present.
- In time, GNI\* will be published on a constant price basis.

National Account – Current	2015	2016	2017
Prices			
(Euro, y-o-y growth rates)			
Gross Domestic Product	262.4bn	273.2bn	294.1bn
(GDP)	(34.4%)	(4.1%)	(7.6%)
minus Net Factor Income			
from rest of the world			
= Gross National Product	200.4bn	222.2bn	233.1bn
(GNP)	(22.2%)	(10.8%)	(4.9%)
add EU subsidies minus EU	1.2bn	1.0bn	1.1bn
taxes			
= Gross National Income	201.7bn	223.2bn	234.2bn
(GNI)	(22.3%)	(10.7%)	(5.0%)
minus retained earnings of re-	-4.6bn	-5.8bn	-4.6bn
domiciled firms			
minus depreciation on foreign	-31.0bn	-36.7bn	-43.1bn
owned IP assets			
minus depreciation on aircraft	-4.6bn	-4.9bn	-5.1bn
leasing			
= GNI*	161.4bn	189.2bn	181.2bn
	(8.6%)	(9.0%)	(3.0%)

#### The current account (CA) is distorted heavily by actions of MNEs – CSO has modified CA to be consistent with GNI\*






Source: CSO, NTMA calculations

Modified CA=CA less (IP Depreciation + Aircraft Leasing Depreciation + Redomiciled Incomes + R&D Services Exports) adding back (Imports of related to Leasing Aircraft + R&D related IP and services Imports). Significant caution should be exercised when viewing Ireland's current account data. MNC's action distort metrics heavily.

### Modified Domestic Demand (MDD) – which ignores exports - is best cyclical indicator

- GNI\* is useful but not timely. MDD is released on a quarterly and real basis.
- MDD ignores the net exports channel. It also omits aircraft leasing and IP imports from investment to give a modified measure of domestic demand.
- The measure includes:
  - private consumption
  - government consumption
  - building investment
  - elements of machinery & equipment investment
  - elements of intangible asset investment
  - value of physical changes in stock
- This measure pegs real growth closer to 2.7% in the year to Q3 2018. Since 2014, annual growth has averaged over 5% when looking at MDD.





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